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CHAIRMAN CECIL GREEN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I welcome you to the hearing. 
As you all know, I'm Senator Cecil Green and I'm Chairman of the Insurance 
Subcommittee on Earthquake Insurance. And with me today is Frank Hill to try to 
come to some conclusion on this earthquake insurance. 
The hearing we are having today is to review, once again, the current status 
of the California Residential Earthquake Recovery Program. This program which 
will provide $15,000 of earthquake damage coverage for every homeowner in the 
State is due to take effect on January 1st, and that's a little more than a 
month from today. 
The problem is that several issues have been raised by a number of insurers 
and others about the implementation of this program. We were willing to deal 
with these issues at our last hearing, but were rather surprised to learn that 
the Commissioner wanted to make it take a different approach. It was suggested 
by the Commissioner that we now repeal this program and consider some sort of 
other disaster assistance program. After this announcement, we were given only 
a short time to question the Commissioner, both on the reasons for requesting a 
repeal and what he intends to do at this point in time. As chairman of this 
committee, I felt it was necessary to continue the hearing until such time the 
Commissioner could adequately respond to questions from Members of this 
Committee and from other Members who worked on seeing that the original 
legislation was passed. I believe the Legislature and the Governor took a big 
step in passing a program like this. If a repeal is considered as necessary, 
then it certainly deserves more discussion than it could have been given last 
time. And even if we proceed, we still need to address problems with the 
current program before it begins. I'm sorry to say, however, that we will still 
not be able to meet with the Commissioner today. His father passed away last 
night and he will be unable to attend today. We give him our best and the 
sympathy for the loss of his father. And because of this, we will still proceed 
with the hearing and focus on the issues in the agenda. But our primary purpose 
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will be to receive responses to concerns we raise in this hearing by the next 
time we meet. We still fully intend to meet with the Commissioner on the future 
date so that some finality can be reached on these issues. 
At this point, Frank, is there anything you'd like to say? 
SENATOR FRANK HILL: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just add my condolences to 
the Commissioner. I'm sorry about the passing of his father. It's unfortunate 
that he can't be here, but certainly it's understandable. 
I agree with you that we ought to work through the agenda at least to try to 
crystallize some of the issues that are remaining out there, and I think it's 
critically important that we pick out a date and set a time for a hearing, and I 
think in the very near future. It's my sense that this program is going to go 
into effect in January, that we need to work to figure out what issues need to 
be resolved to put it into place. I do not believe, if there is a Special 
Session call of the Legislature, that it's going to deal with the direction that 
the Commissioner talked about a couple weeks ago. And so I think we need to be 
responsible and work on trying to solve the outstanding issues. Maybe if we can 
just deal with that first item of business in terms of that additional meeting. 
Was it my understanding that December 4th was a good day for the Commissioner? 
MS. MASAKO DOLAN: Masako Dolan with the Department of Insurance. We looked 
at his calendar and it appears that he will be in Sacramento on December the 4th 
and we would make every effort to change his appointments to facilitate a 
hearing. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, since we didn't have even the first hearing and 
through the death of his father, not being here today, we need to have some sort 
of guarantee that that date and time he will be here for that meeting. 
MS. DOLAN: I believe - Yes, he will be here. We will make the changes in 
his schedule. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right. So, we do have a guarantee that he will be here 
on the December 4th. So then we can direct staff to start the process in having 
another hearing December the 4th. OK? 
SENATOR HILL: My hope is, Mr. Chairman, that today we can - I'm not sure, 
let me just throw out one of the issues, obviously, that has to be resolved is 
the whole mandatory issue, and I'm not clear in my own mind what are all the 
different options out there in terms of the mandatory aspect of the program. 
And I know the Commissioner headed in one direction, there's the debate about 
legislative action versus regulatory action, and so I'd like to hopefully, when 
we're done, when we come in on December 4th, be able to say, "here is what the 
staff has worked on, between the Commissioner's office and all of our staffs", 
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and say, "here's four options that we - are available to us in terms of dealing 
with that mandatory issue," or the deductible, etc., etc., and so that we can, 
you know, bring some finale to this. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I believe you're absolutely right, Senator Hill. We 
do know some of the issues and we do know some of the problems; however, we 
haven't had that closeness of working between your staff, my staff, and the 
Commissioner's staff to bring forth some type of recommendation that says this 
is what we're going to do in the future. And, like on the mandatory 
participation, we have several different Leg Counsel rulings and one particular 
one is that the Commissioner, by regulation, can make it mandatory. There are 
some other rulings that we've seen from Leg Counsel, that says he cannot. So 
maybe we need to focus on what can be done and not what is currently being done. 
All right? 
With that then, we'll have the Department's staff, and you're here. We're 
going to go through the agenda issue by issue. You've been furnished with a 
Subcommittee Questions-Based-On-Issue paper so that we'd like to have you start 
with any opening remarks and then we'll go through that paper issue by issue. I 
have made the headings 1, 2, 3, and so forth, and then you do have the questions 
that we, as a subcommittee, feel should be answered. I'll probably read them so 
that the audience will know what we're talking about before we go through them, 
the questions. All right? Now, do you have anything that you'd like to say? 
MS. DOLAN: Let me just briefly make a few comments. The Commissioner 
called me this morning and he had every intent of being here, however his father 
died at 7 o'clock, and could not come here. we will schedule the hearing so 
that he can be here to answer the broader policy issues. He really was sorry 
that he had to leave, but he had the Executive Life decision pending and had to 
leave last time. 
We do not, the Department does not propose to outline a detailed program 
that would better meet the disaster needs. Our major concern is the financing 
structure that the current program doesn't add up. And I think that the 
questions that you asked, we will be able to go into the details of our 
concerns. It is the combination of insufficient rates, deductibles, no means to 
make the program mandatory, and a provision that provides free coverage in the 
first year to millions. In addition, we recently learned from the experts that 
we hired on reinsurance that, of the high cost of purchasing reinsurance for the 
program and the serious negative consequences of purchasing financial 
reinsurance are issuing revenue bonds. The fact that the program - the prior 
provisions, the rates, the deductibles, and no means to make the program 
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mandatory really undercuts the financial stability of the program. The 
Commission also has real concern, given this difficulty in the financing, that 
since it is prefunded and funded through an insurance mechanism, that the 
consumers will expect, even though we will try and make every effort to tell 
them about prorate of payments, that they will have different coverage than what 
would be possible in the program, particularly in the current years, that unless 
there are changes that we will discuss later in much more detail for the long 
term of the program. 
With that, I think that, you know, I believe that we ought to go point by 
point and have an actual 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right then if we can start, I'll start with- the issue 
No. 1 is mandatory participation, and we know that your department knew that 
based on a Legislative Counsel's Opinion requested by Senator Hill, you could 
not propose a regulation which allowed you to prohibit the issuance or renewal 
of residence or property coverage for nonpayment of the surcharge. And 
notwithstanding that fact, you proposed such a regulation which was rejected by 
the Office of Administrative Law. Your new regulations have deleted this 
controversial issue. What option did you consider? And explain why you 
rejected each option. And why did you reject the option provided by the 
Legislative Counsel, which allowed you to require insurers to initiate 
collection actions for delinquent surcharges? 
MR. RICHARD HOLDEN: We did review the Leg Counsel Opinion that was 
requested by Senator Frank Hill, and in that Opinion there were basically two 
options that were discussed. One was requiring insurance companies to initiate 
collection actions for the surcharge, which I believe is the option that you've 
alluded to in your Implementation-Issues paper. And the second was requiring 
that they purchase the reinsurance or else they would not be able to be renewed 
or issued a new policy, which was discussed as an option at the first hearing on 
February 6th. We chose to go with the renewal or a new issuance option because 
after legal review, we believe that we did have the authority to do that. We 
submitted that option in the regulations. The OAL disapproved that particular 
option, struck it out, and in fact in their comments they indicated, and this is 
quoted and it's included in the first page of your packet, that "the Act makes 
no provision for any enforcement to this surcharge in the event the insured does 
not pay the insurer. This silence was maintained by the Legislature and the two 
subsequent cleanup bills passed. Since the Legislature had repeated 
opportunities to include provisions authorizing enforcement powers, if any, the 
Commission has in this regard. However, it cannot be said that the Legislature 
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ignored the consequences which arise from failure to pay the surcharge", and 
they mention the two things that are in the bill. 
It's our feeling that including the option to require collection by insurers 
has two problems: First, the OAL suggests very strongly, in their opinion, that 
unless there is specific authority for a mandatory enforcement, that they will 
disapprove it; and secondly, it's really more political. We believe that the 
insurers would be much more adamant about opposing a collection action activity 
on their part than they would on renewal or new issuances. And so that is the 
reason why we chose that first option. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Which leaves probably some questions on that decision to 
choose that option. No. 1, you were told that it was illegal, it couldn't be 
done, and then it did come forth and bring forth something that was legal and 
could be done by regulation and then that was not done. You didn't answer that. 
MR. HOLDEN: Our reading of the Leg Counsel Opinion was not that it was 
illegal or couldn't be done. In fact they suggest that it might be a possible 
option, but it would be something that would be subject to challenge. After we 
had Department attorneys look at it, we felt that we probably did have the 
authority to do it. OAL has subsequently ruled that we don't. And given their 
ruling on the first, we think it would be very unlikely that they would approve 
an enforcement option that would require collection actions on the part of the 
insurers. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I guess the next step was to - you found that that 
regulation wouldn't work, but you didn't put another regulation in place that 
possibly could work as far as Leg Counsel was concerned. 
MR. HOLDEN: We felt that we were out of options at that point and that 
given their very clear and specific language that specific legislative authority 
was required, that we felt that we needed to bring this back to the Legislature. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But you see we don't have the subject of time. Something 
has to go in place by regulation before January the 1st, and you only have to 
bring forth a regulation. Any change in the Legislature and any change in the 
bill will require a period of time. so be sure and address that point for our 
next hearing because I think this is a key point to the total legislation, the 
mandatory participation of all property owners within the state of California. 
And by Leg Counsel and the way I read the ruling and findings, is that they 
did give you an option for regulation. It might not be the best regulation, but 
it is a regulation that you can put in place and is legal. And then we'll get, 
maybe later, some word from the insurers themselves as to the cost of that type 
of a regulation, it could be high. Next question 
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SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman, before we leave that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes. 
SENATOR HILL: I guess I've got a couple of questions. The first one is I'd 
like to get a sense, and I think that's what your comment was about, from the 
insurers in terms of which of these options- you know, I'll accept your 
characterization that you think the cancellation is less - I assume they don't 
like any of them, or I know they don't like any of them - is less onerous than 
the option which you took on. It seems to me, and I don't have a copy of the 
OAL decision here, but it seems to me that there was - I believe that was my 
bill this, the 412 that we went through - we had a battle in the Senate 
Insurance Committee, the insurers put some prohibition language in that stopped 
the cancellation process. We got to, I think, Assembly Ways and Means, and that 
language was taken out and there was a compromise that, as I recall, essentially 
said what we will do is give some broad authority to the Commissioner in terms 
of enforcing that. And I guess - so my question is is my recollection of that 
legislative process correct? I remember that owner's provision was taken out 
and if that was true, if we, you know, what was that language that was put into 
that bill at that point, and why doesn't - you know, how come the OAL - I guess 
the second part of it - when you originally went forward with your initial set 
of regulations, you obviously had some attorneys who said we think that we have 
the authority to do this. 
And, you know, there's also that question about - no, you know, OAL is one 
step in the process, there're other options in terms of challenging that and 
have you talked about that, and what's the implications of that? 
MR. HOLDEN: The language that was in SB 412 was - it was broad language and 
it was tied to collection of the surcharge, remittance of the surcharge by 
insurers and I believe the language said the Commissioner shall have the 
authority to adopt regulations under this subdivision. We had referenced a 
similar type of language that was already in SB 2902 authorizing adoption of 
regulations by the Commissioner, and OAL did not believe that it was specific 
enough to provide us the authority to do something specific. We did have 
attorneys look at it and they felt that we had a case but that it was a call, it 
could go either way depending on the decision. And I think the insurance 
industry was very interested in these regulations, particularly with this 
provision, and they didn't want this provision and we felt that they probably 
wouldn't like the collection provision, they would dislike that even more. We 
felt that at that point, given the time frame, that our hands were really tied 
in terms of proceeding, and that we were basically stuck and required a 
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legislative authorization. 
I hope that's responsive. 
SENATOR HILL: Now what options do you have if you want to challenge that 
OAL ruling? 
MS. DOLAN: In the past ••• 
SENATOR HILL: Do you go to court? Is that what happens? 
MS. DOLAN: Well, in the past, the Commissioner has appealed to the Governor 
to overrule OAL, that would be one. And then, I believe, we could try and go 
through the court process. 
SENATOR HILL: Uh-hum. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Senator Hill? Is that ••• 
SENATOR HILL: Well, just so we understand the point, the - just as I 
suspected, the next step, and if I recall, now we're talking about a different 
issue, but I think there was a Prop 103 rebate issue. Or wasn't there a process 
where the Commissioner asked the Governor to overrule OAL and that the Governor 
did that. 
MS. DOLAN: And he did. Yes. He has ten days to overrule. 
SENATOR HILL: So that's - Oh, he has ten days to overrule, so that option 
has passed? 
MS. DOLAN: Um, in terms of the first set of regulations, yes. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So we're left with no regulation? 
MS. DOLAN: For mandatory, yes. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Right. All right, according to the briefing you provided 
legislative staff, your department indicates that your implementation RFP calls 
for the use of the program administrator, which currently is esc, to collect the 
surcharge and enforce collection. How have you determined your authority to 
accomplish this when you have publicly stated that you have no authority to do 
so? 
SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman, while they're thinking about that, before we 
leave this mandatory issue I just want to make another broad observation and I'd 
like to hear the reaction from the Department. 
It's my opinion that because of the Commissioner's statement about the 
program not working, being a disaster for the California homeowners - I can't 
remember all of the comments that he made - if it was an insurance company I 
would have to deny it, etc., etc. -that the possibility of a legislative 
authorization is nil. That if you think that - you know, after you set up the 
scenario that says this program's a disaster, it's not going to work, it's 
insolvent. Now what you've got to do is get a bill through the Legislature to 
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force people to opt into a program that we've already said is a disaster and is 
not going to work, that legislatively that, you know, you've foreclosed that 
option as well. And on the same hand I do not believe that the legislative 
option is foreclosed in terms of defining more specifically the Commissioner's 
authority. I thought we already did that in that Ways and Means language. 
Obviously, there seems to be dispute about that. But at least my reading of the 
political situation is there's a possibility of getting legislation through that 
gives the Commissioner more authority in terms of enforcing it through 
regulations, but I don't believe that you can come back with a bill, maybe Rusty 
wants to carry it, that says if you don't pay your earthquake surcharge, your 
homeowner's policy is going to be canceled. 
MS. DOLAN: You understand that the Commissioner has the same concerns that 
you do. And given that OAL - he has attempted on one occasion to put in what we 
felt were very onerous provisions. Having that overturned, he feels that it is 
now back in the legislative court. He has done that once, found it very 
onerous, as you recalled he criticized in the press for it, and the options are 
very poor. That's part of the problem, structurally, with the program. That as 
the first legislative opinion stated, that Assemblyman Connelly had, the program 
is mandatory. However, there is no enforcement mechanism. From OAL's point of 
view, to say that an administrator has the ability to implement a program and 
then develop whatever enforcement mechanism, particularly in view of the fact 
that the Legislature failed to act on two occasions in terms of two separate 
follow-up bills, we find that difficult. 
SENATOR HILL: Well, except, I don't think you ought to - I think you're 
jumping to the wrong conclusion. This is not some new issue that Senator Green 
or I or anybody, or Rusty, who worked through this, the mandatory issue is 
something we talked about all the way through. We knew how controversial it 
was. The Legislative response to that issue, we knew the program had to be 
mandatory for it to be actuarially sound, was we will give language we thought 
brought authority to the Commissioner through regulations to impose that. So, I 
don't think you can jump to the conclusion that nobody ever thought about it and 
we forgot about this issue and it was just going to go away, now we had to deal 
with it. We thought we had dealt with it and now there seems to be a road 
block. And I guess my point is when you then stand up and say the program is a 
disaster, go back and fix it legislatively, I think you have taken away a lot 
of, at least a lot of the parameters in terms of a Legislative solution. 
ASSEMBLYMAN RUSTY AREIAS: If I could ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes, Rusty. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: ••• interject. I mean, I couldn't agree with Senator 
Hill more. Political environments result in lots of actions, there are lots of 
people on both sides, or all four sides of the issue, that are looking at the 
sixth successive year of drought as an opportunity to make some changes in how 
we allocate water. The incident in Stockton as it relates to assault weapons 
certainly created an atmosphere that allowed some things to be done. And those 
of us that have worked in the whole earthquake area, Brian Stoner, Tom Tobin, my 
colleagues up here, all recognize that with every earthquake, or with every 
significant seismic event there provides a window of opportunity to get some new 
things done. And we did that in the aftermath of Loma Prieta. I don't know if 
the statistics were right, but they said that this program, had it been in place 
at the time, would have covered 25 of the 27 thousand homes that were damaged, 
completely. And as we get further and further away from that seismic event, the 
opportunity to bring together the critical mass to put a program in place, I 
mean it's probably gone now. 
So the next time there's a seismic event, people will be asking the same 
questions that they asked with the recent events in the Persian Gulf: Why don't 
we, after all these years, have a comprehensive energy policy? What happened to 
Operation Independence? Those were front-burner issues nationally in terms of 
our national policy back in the mid-70's and early 1980's. And they're going to 
be asking the same thing: Why didn't the Legislature do more? What happened to 
this comprehensive earthquake insurance coverage that we were going to have. 
And that's what's unfortunate. I mean, I had to read that this plan should be 
repealed, through the newspapers. 
SENATOR HILL: Well, we had 60 seconds advanced notice. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes. We didn't even have the newspaper advanced warning. 
(Laughter.) Rusty, you're absolutely right as far as the windows of 
opportunity. This subcommittee was formed after the Whittier earthquake, which 
goes back to 1987. And I believe probably of us sitting here, I have sat in 
probably more earthquake insurance and earthquake hearings than anyone in this 
Legislature. Because it was in my district, Whittier was in my district in 
1987, and I heard all those cries for help from all those people out there with 
the high deductibles insurance. And each time we've had a quake, the Loma 
Prieta after the Whittier, we've heard the same thing. 
So here is a Senator that has been now for almost six years in this issue. 
We've had several issues, or several bills in front of us. When this bill was 
signed we knew there were some problems with it. We knew that what we had done 
was major in effort and it was a major thing to put it in place. All of you sit 
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back and say this won't work; however, what we've been doing in the past, and if 
you'll analyze what happened in Whittier and Lorna Prieta, was that the State, in 
emergency session, authorized a billion dollars worth of coverage to help those 
people. That won't stop. We're not going to let the people in the State 
suffer. None of us will. And I don't think you've fed that factor into your 
equations on regulations and so forth. You're looking at this as a major, major 
earthquake. Now, what the history of the State has been is one or two major 
earthquakes over a 20, 30 or 40 year period, and as we go along, we have the 
minor quakes that come along that give the people the big problem. And this 
coverage would work if, through regulations, which is authorized in our mind by 
this legislation, the regulation to make this mandatory, I think that's your 
charge as staff members, is how do you make the legislation work. And as all 
we're getting from staff at this point is it can't work. I think that that's 
what our next hearing is going to be about, and I don't want to make this into a 
debate. We want to make it work, all of us sitting here. And we, then, will do 
our political thing with the Legislature. 
Now, early last year, the Commissioner came to me and said, "Will you extend 
this for six months?" We, the staff, I, Senator Hill, and Areias, said, "Is 
that enough time to get this fixed this year?" And the answer from your office 
was "Yes", you didn't want more than six months continuance. And so now all of 
a sudden at the last minute, we find it wasn't enough time. The issues are 
still there. So I charge that staff should be doing a little more. And that's 
why the hearings today, is let's go through these. 
And I won't go off on these kind of tirades because this is an important 
program, and it is our charge to make this program work. 
MS. DOLAN: The Commissioner full acknowledges the problems that confronted 
homeowners when they were - when they filed and understood the impact of the 
deductibles and the serious problem it is for a number of people. 
The concern that we have, as I have stated before, is that we cannot put the 
financing mechanism together under the perimeters of the bill's- or the law, as 
it is, to give any assurance to the people. If, in fact, there was another Lorna 
Prieta, we will be paying cents on the dollars or if we go into a revenue bond 
mechanism, we would have 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Wait a minute, wait a minute. Can I interject here? 
MS. DOLAN: OK. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: OK. Now the statistics that I'm aware of, of the 
27,000 homes damaged in Lorna Prieta, 25,000 of them would have been covered by 
the program assuming that the fund was fully funded and had an opportunity to 
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build up. Now, why is that a mistaken notion? 
MS. DOLAN: The problems - the reinsurance market has drastically changed 
since Senator Green went to London and talked 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well I understand that, but let me correct you just a 
moment. The reinsurance is only one equation. There is the State of California 
with loans. There is the State of California with bonds. There are all kinds 
of mechanisms where you can guarantee your fund. But the big problem is the 
mandatory participation, because to pay those moneys back. We recognize that. 
That's why the mandatory participation is such a big issue. 
MS. DOLAN: You're right. It is a basic issue. 
The other problem is the current deductible and surcharges are such that the 
annual expected losses are not covered by what we can collect, so it makes it 
worse in terms of ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But, listen to me. At Lorna Prieta we had no $15,000 worth 
of insurance and 25,000 of those people would have been covered. We, the 
Legislature, put a billion dollars into that. And so when you say to me it 
wasn't covered, then it doesn't go in here and come out the other side because 
we did take action to make sure that those people were covered. 
MS. DOLAN: Senator Green ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: so you have to have a combination of thinking. 
MS. DOLAN: If it were possible for you to put a General Fund commitment or 
a State guarantee to the unfunded liability, we would have no problems with this 
program. The problem that we have is it appears as insurance when you collect 
it through an insurance mechanism and people think that they will have a certain 
amount of coverage. And, in the early years, or if the surcharge or deductibles 
are not changed, we will be faced with proration unless the Legislature comes to 
backfill for the program. Now, the Legislature did, you know, raise revenue 
through a quarter-cent sales tax and it made a lot of changes and helped a 
number of people. Whether or not the Legislature would see fit to backfill in 
terms of a deductible given the other drains on things like highways or public 
buildings, I don't know, and I think that that would be an issue that they would 
address. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: can I - I want to interject here for just a minute. 
When the fund was fully funded, how much was in it? It was 1. -
It was $400 million a year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Yeah, but then it went up to 1.7 billion. Wasn't it 
1.5 or 1.7 billion. I mean if you have an earthquake of the magnitude that 
you're talking about that would force the kind of proration and return dimes on 
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the dollars, let me tell you that our priorities as the Legislature are going to 
change significantly anyway, just like they did with Lorna Prieta. 
It's increasingly clear to me that this is not bad policy, it was never bad 
policy, it's bad politics, and it's always been bad politics. It was bad 
politics the day after Lorna Prieta and it's just getting worse and worse and 
worse, and I'm convinced that a part of any preparedness plan has got to include 
comprehensive mandatory earthquake homeowners insurance. We talk a lot about 
preparedness and we talked a lot more about it in the year after Lorna Prieta, 
but of all the things that we do, the most heroic act of all is to be prepared. 
And if you're going to be prepared, you need this part of the equation. I mean 
I'm not hearing anything that indicates to me that this is an insurmountable 
problem. The politics may be insurmountable given the worsening economy and 
maybe changes in the insurance industry, but we still have got to put a 
shelf-ready proposal in place. And if the politics don't allow it right now - I 
mean all of us know something about politics - we've got to have that proposal 
in place so that the next opportunity in terms of an improved economy or another 
earthquake, heaven forbid, that we can put this plan into place. I mean, I'm 
not hearing anything that makes this insurmountable. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, you know, and you're absolutely right. There is a 
gamble to doing this and there is no way you are ever going to take totally the 
gamble out, because if you have this start January 1st, which the law says it 
will happen, and if you don't have any money there, you can't pay off. 
Now, if you were to look at the time that has gone by, six months, and 
figure $400 million a year in collections, you would have $200 million sitting 
in your Fund today. And then if we go through another year, you'll have a 
$400 million figure plus the $200, and that's $600 million. 
The administration of the Fund is very critical. Now we're going to get 
further down into the hearing and I understand you've even authorized building a 
new building. Where are you going to put these offices. See, we hear a lot of 
rumors of what's happening on this and if you ••• 
MS. DOLAN: Is it the Department of Insurance? I haven't heard that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Sal. Can you help me with this one? 
MR. SAL BIANCO: What Senator Green is alluding to is the Department's RFP 
and the building in Natomas, and the details on the building in Natomas. 
Whether the building is being - The questions were was the building being 
constructed prior to the time; is there a lease for the building; who's building 
is it? Those were the questions that Senator Green's going to get into. 
MR. HOLDEN: The building you're referring to is Computer Sciences 
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Corporation's Career Fund Operations Center, and that is a leased building and 
is a building that has been there. They are leasing out a portion of the 
building and currently, right now, they're having tenant improvements made so 
they can occupy the building and run the program from there. That will be the 
location of the data center and where Computer Sciences Corporation staff will 
reside. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, we'll get into a whole raft of questions on how you 
handle that part of this insurance program, so let's get back to the agenda. 
And I asked the question, No. 2. - Sal, did you have a question on mandatory 
participation? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes, Senator and Members. I'd like to ask one quick question 
before I look at the written record. Could you tell us whether or not the 
May 22nd amendments added to Senate Bill 412 were finally removed from that 
bill? Those were the amendments you had a great deal of problems with, the 
amendments that were added as it related to mandatory. Do you recall? 
MR. HOLDEN: I don't recall the - what those amendments did specifically. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Well then, let me just . .. 
MR. HOLDEN: were these in Senate Insurance, Davis amendments? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes. Were those amendments deleted? 
MR. HOLDEN: They were. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. If they were deleted, then let's look to your memorandum 
to Steve Sutro dated July 12th, from you to Steve Sutro, it's a document that's 
already been handed out to the Committee the last time. Let me quote, if I 
might. You go on to say "as I mentioned to you, the amendments to SB 412 
adopted in Senate I.e. & c. at the request of senator Davis undermine the 
financial solvency of the California" - of the Fund, I'll just paraphrase - "The 
amendments I am particularly concerned about undermine the Department's ability 
to make participation in the program mandatory and shift interest earnings from 
the Fund to the coffers of insurance companies. We urge that the committee 
amend out the May 22nd amendments as specified." 
And then under mandatory participation you say, "The strike out text on 
page 5, lines 1 through 6, represent provisions that in our view would have 
provided sufficient authority for enforcement of mandatory participation in the 
program. These provisions would have permitted the adoption of regulations that 
make nonpayment of surcharges required under the program equivalent to 
nonpayment of premium. Homeowners that refuse to participate would therefore 
have to face a notice of cancellation from their residential fire insurance 
carrier. This approach was discussed extensively and has the endorsement of the 
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Governor's office." That latter point I'll get to in a moment. "The amended 
provisions on page 5, lines 7 through 19, undermine mandatory participation and 
allow homeowners to pay into the fund program on an installment basis. 
Mandatory participation is undermined because surcharges under the May 22nd 
amendments are no longer part of premium and specific authority for the 
Commissioner to adopt regulations to enforce participation was deleted. 
Installment payments to a hazard program are dangerous because additional 
enforcement activities are required and interest income that can be received 
under the Fund is reduced." 
One final note, you say, "Senator Hill proposing amendments in the July 16 
hearing", that would be Assembly Insurance, "that'll allow all homeowners in the 
first year of the program to be covered until their first renewal date." And 
then you go on on the free rider. 
So my first question is, did the May 22nd - and then you have attached the 
amendments that you propose. Were those amendments adopted by the Assembly 
Insurance Committee? 
MR. HOLDEN: No, they were not. 
MR. BIANCO: Were they adopted at all before this bill went to the Governor? 
MR. HOLDEN: I think the only thing that was adopted was the last sentence: 
"The Commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement this subdivision." It 
was not - the surcharge was not included as part of the total amount due on 
premium. 
MR. BIANCO: So therefore, the amendments that you suggested for deletion 
were never deleted from the program, deleted from that bill? 
MR. HOLDEN: The amendments were taken out. These amendments that - the 
proposed amendments that you have were added in only in part, really only that 
last sentence. 
MR. BIANCO: So, as a result, those amendments made in the Senate Insurance 
Committee remained in the bill? They were removed from the bill. 
MS. DOLAN: They were removed. 
MR. BIANCO: If they were removed from the bill, in the process of their 
removal, what makes that different than what you say in your memorandum that 
says if you take them out, you've dealt with mandatory? Maybe you can help 
explain that, that's my confusion. 
MS. DOLAN: It just has to be read with the amendments. 
MR. HOLDEN: Yeah, it really has to be read with the amendments in there, 
and what the amendments say is that the only thing that is there, the only 
Page 14 
change from existing law is the Commissioner shall have authority to adopt 
regulations under this subdivision. That is the only change. 
And a note - I should note this on timing because this came up before on the 
regulations and the appeal of the regulations, the emergency regulations were 
approved by OAL on September 16th. However, SB 412 was not approved by the 
Governor until October 14th, I believe, 13th or 14th, so there would have been -
we couldn't have appealed to OAL based on 412 since it was not yet law. 
SENATOR HILL: Well, then, does that mean that that provision which we put 
into SB 412, the Commissioner has broad authority, was not part of the OAL 
decision when that decision was made? 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. Could not have been because it was not 
chaptered. 
SENATOR HILL: OK. So that provision which we thought we gave to the 
Commissioner the authority, you went ahead with regulations before that bill was 
chaptered into law? 
MR. HOLDEN: As we were required to, right. 
SENATOR HILL: The OAL looks at it and says you don't have the authority to 
do that and turns them down. Two weeks later a bill gets chaptered into law 
specifically says a Commissioner has authority to implement these regulations, 
and you guys don't do anything with it? At that point you don't decide well the 
whole game is changed because OAL has to look at a new piece of legislation, or 
a piece of legislation which now has been chaptered into law? 
MR. HOLDEN: OAL was very clear in saying that specific authority needed to 
be there for ••• 
SENATOR HILL: But two weeks later a bill passed that said the commissioner 
has authority to implement regulations to enforce the provision. 
MR. HOLDEN: There was similar language in SB 2902 in terms of authority to 
adopt regulations, and that is what we based our ability to adopt regulations. 
The language is not that much different between the current existing law at that 
time, SB 2902, and what was in SB 412. 
SENATOR HILL: But you cite a couple of times and I guess OAL cites a couple 
of times, saying, "well this mandatory issue has not been dealt with". Yet, 
indeed, the mandatory issue was dealt with again and it just hadn't been 
chaptered into law yet, the Governor hadn't signed that bill yet, at the time 
OAL made its decision. 
MR. HOLDEN: It's our rating of OAL that they would not accept a provision 
based on that general language to adopt regulations. 
SENATOR HILL: And did you ask the Governor's office to overturn the OAL 
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regulations, similar to what you did on the Prop 103 rebate? 
MS. DOLAN: No, we did not. 
SENATOR HILL: And any reason why? Any - I mean, what was the thinking on 
that? 
MS. DOLAN: We saw your press release criticizing the mechanism that we had 
chosen. Commissioner also had very strong feelings that he wanted specific 
legislative authority for the, um, the enforcement mechanism, given the concerns 
that had been expressed. 
MR. HOLDEN: And of course 412 was not yet chaptered. We didn't have any -
we didn't even have that to appeal on. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. I think Sal has another follow-up question. 
MR. BIANCO: Yes. Um, to follow up to Senator Hill's question. If 412 was 
now chaptered into law, do the new regulations, not the emergency regs, but the 
draft regulations; i.e., the basis for the tomorrow's hearing. They're going to 
become effective in January. Am I not correct? Do they reflect the provisions 
of 412 as chaptered law? 
MR. HOLDEN: They reflect the provisions as they pertain to condominiums and 
other things, but we have not, uh - we have not dealt with the mandatory 
enforcement. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. So therefore, neither the emergency regs nor the new regs 
that will supersede the emergency regs reflect yet the provisions of 412 as it 
relates to how the Legislature changed the May 27 amendments added into 412 by 
the Senate Insurance Committee. Is that correct? 
MR. HOLDEN: It's correct, but neither version contains the mandatory 
enforcement. 
MR. BIANCO: May I ask a follow-up question? 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Sure. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. I'd like to turn for a moment to your letter of June 24th 
to the Governor. In that you say, on page 3, on mandatory participation, say 
"consequently, I am having my staff study whether I would have the authority to 
issue regulations that will make the program mandatory. I am alerting you to 
this problem because a legislative solution still may be necessary to insure 
that the program is truly mandatory and therefore widely subscribed." My 
question on what I've read to you is what was the result of the staff's study 
and does the Governor's office know, as a follow up to this letter of June 24th, 
what you found? I didn't find it in any other documentation that went to the 
Governor beyond that date, so I'm just wondering if there was just a document 
you did that we haven't seen. 
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MR. HOLDEN: There was not a study, per se. There were discussions about 
what we could put in the emergency regulations and we did put - we believed at 
that time that we could put in the provisions that would make it mandatory 
through renewal and new issuances. When OAL struck that down we had a change 
of, uh, a change of thinking on that. They were very specific in terms of 
wanting specific legislative authority. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Which didn't come for two weeks. 
MR. HOLDEN: Which didn't come for two weeks and I think it's arguable that 
it's specific in that it doesn't prescribe an enforcement mechanism. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But don't you put yourself in the position of passing 
judgment without giving OAL a regulation. How can they make a ruling whether 
it's right or wrong? Don't you think that you should've taken the effort to 
pacify OAL? 
MS. DOLAN: The Commissioner concluded, based on the information provided, 
that he did not want to propose another onerous regulation without further 
direction from the Legislature. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, it's not the Legislature's responsibility to 
administer this fund. It is the responsibility of the Insurance Commissioner. 
Did you take the other step and contact the industry and have suggestions from 
the industry on how this mandatory participation can be handled? 
MS. DOLAN: There have been numerous discussions on the mandatory provisions 
with the industry. I'm sure they will comment on their feelings about that 
provision. 
SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman. I don't think we need to spend a lot more 
time on the mandatory issue, but I just want to make this observation. 
There's going to be another earthquake. There's going to be another 
earthquake, the Legislature is going to race back to Sacramento in a special 
session. We fell over ourselves to spend $400 million out of the reserve fund 
to put into the Whittier quake. We fell over ourselves, raced up to Sacramento, 
we couldn't give money away fast enough in terms of new programs and new ideas. 
After the Lorna Prieta quake we raised the sales tax to finance, I think it was 
$1.4 billion in rebuilding when we went back. There's going to be another 
earthquake and the Legislature, unlike the statement which the Commissioner has 
made and you repeated today, that people will be paid cents on the dollars. My 
prediction is the mentality will be exactly the opposite, that we will be 
figuring out whatever it takes to fund that program. 
And I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Areias's comment that we need to be 
prepared, we need to put a program into place. To rub our hands about well this 
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mandatory issue, we didn't get the regulations, we didn't have the bill for two 
more weeks. We're just missing the boat, and I think the issues in terms of 
whether the fund is sound or that the different actuaries - you know, we have 
these dueling actuaries. I will point out to you that those actuarial 
assumptions did not come from me as the author of the bill, did not come from 
the Legislature. Those actuarial assumptions came from the Department of 
Insurance. Now there was a different Insurance Commissioner, I'll save you that 
breath, a different Insurance Commissioner, but 
MS. DOLAN: Thank you. (Laughter.) 
SENATOR HILL: ••• I see some of the same players right here who pushed that 
bill through the Legislature who worked for the Department of Insurance are 
still here in public policy positions today in the office. And so my point is 
how am I supposed to know whether that program is supposed to be $12 to $60, $25 
to $75, if it's a $51 average premium, a $36 premium? That's all based on 
whatever assumptions you put in there. 
We're going to have an earthquake and the first day the fund is not 
actuarially sound. If you had one five years down the road, it is. Senator 
Green's point about coming up with $400 million a year or substantially more, I 
think is well taken. This program is going to go forward and I think the more 
we talk about it isn't going to work because of what I believe are really minor 
problems that your office keeps coming up with, I think the more irresponsible 
that we're being in terms of putting a program into place and waiting for that 
rainy day. 
MS. DOLAN: I think on that issue that we should proceed perhaps with the 
other issues about the financing or with the surcharges so that we can share the 
technical information. You will at least have the benefit of the information 
that the Commissioner had. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I guess, to finish with this mandatory participation, 
I still feel the Department has not done an adequate job. I would hope that you 
will be able to come up with some of these questions and answers that we have 
just given you. You can hear our concerns and December the 4th is how many days 
away? Two weeks away? Two weeks away. I would hope that we will hear 
something different from your department December the 4th. There is a way to 
make it mandatory. And you should not be in a position to second guess OAL. 
You have times of - and this Legislature did put some language in the bill to 
work for. It seems that you're not - you're reading into it what you want to 
read into it, and we are challenging that. I believe that's our position of the 
Committee. We want this program to work. It will work if it is administered 
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properly. 
So with that in mind, let's go to the next issue. And it's issue No. 2 on 
your paper. And does the Commissioner have adequate authority to implement this 
program and require participation? That's what we just finished. So we'll go 
into the issue: is there a need for increasing the surcharge and our deductible 
for this fund; and what steps have been taken to obtain reinsurance to sell 
revenue bonds'/ 
MR. HOLDEN: Senator Green. Richard Holden with the Department. I'll begin 
by giving you a brief overview while people are 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Can we make room here at the table - some more chairs for 
the insurance companies because there are some other people that will be on this 
issue. Yeah, this is risk management and reinsurance. Why don't you identify 
yourselves for the record so that we know who is here and then we'll ask 
questions as we go along. 
MR. RALPH MAURER: I'm Ralph Maurer, Risk Manager for the State. 
MR. LARRY LAWRENCE: Lawrence with Jardine Insurance Brokers in Los Angeles. 
MR. HEMET SHAW: And I'm Hemet Shaw with Risk Management Software in 
Mountain View, California. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you. All right, now from the Department. 
MR. HOLDEN: Just a brief overview. As you know, the issue of rates has 
been a concern since February 6th and what we decided to undertake shortly after 
that hearing was a data collection process, an extensive data collection process 
that I don't think has been done heretofore, to collect data on actual 
residences that are insured by residential property insurance statewide. We 
began that effort in March and sent out a data call to property insurers 
throughout the State to receive that data. Now the purpose of receiving that 
data was to do a risk analysis, to give us some real numbers or some better 
estimated numbers than we had been working with or than you had been working 
with last year. So, we collected that data. It finally came in from the 
insurers in July. All the data was received. 
we put out a Request for Proposal to get loss estimates from various firms 
that perform this type of work, particularly for insurance companies, and are 
very skilled at using computer models to develop loss estimates for insurance 
purposes. Subsequent to release of the RFP we selected a firm to proceed with 
that, Risk Management Software of Mountain View, California. Mr. Hemet Shaw is 
here from that firm, and they undertook the process of analyzing this large data 
base using the software that they have developed over a number of years, in fact 
that were actually developed at Stanford University and is actually a licensed 
Page 19 
product of Stanford University, and was developed, I believe, mostly at the 
Department of Civil Engineering at stanford. I will let RMS talk more about 
that. 
We put them on a very short time frame because we did want the estimates 
before the end of the Session. We gave them basically a week to respond to the 
RFP, gave all firms a week to respond to the RFP. They turned around a quick 
RFP. Their proposal was selected as being the best technically at the lowest 
cost and they have proceeded to do the loss estimation and they did it in a 
record amount of time, in a couple of weeks, working weekends, working nights, 
to get us the estimates before the end of the Session. As you all may recall we 
had made the commitment to provide this information. We were delayed in that 
because a lot of the data didn't come in until July from the insurance 
companies. Once the data came in, it needed to be cleaned up and prepared for 
this type of estimation. They prepared an initial report August 30th and we 
shared those results with you and your staffs September 3rd. Since then they've 
gone back and looked at the data, cleaned up some of the items and have prepared 
a final report which is in your packet that we handed out to you, the thicker 
packet, and there are a number of estimates. The selection of estimates that 
are included in that package were based on recommendations by the SB 2608 
advisory committee. They suggested that we look at a number of different 
options and we had RMS do that, look at different deductibles, different 
coverages and see how the rates would shake out under those different 
conditions. 
That report was completed and I believe it provides quite a bit of 
information for policy judgment, and I think the best thing for me to do is to 
turn it over to Mr. Shaw of Risk Management Software and he can give you further 
information about the model, its operation and the process. 
MR. SHAW: As Richard just mentioned, several months ago we were brought in 
to this process to take a look at the risk to the Fund. The models we used had 
been under development for approximately 20 years at Stanford University, 
primarily. And our firm is essentially a spin-off from the University comprised 
of the key researchers on that project. Rather than get into the details of the 
methodology up front, what I'd like to do is just get straight to the results of 
our analyses and then address any questions you may have on the model or what 
we've done. 
Basically, we took a look at this situation as a classic portfolio 
management decision process that we go through routinely with our insurance 
industry clients. We had a portfolio detail data that was collected by the 
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Department, approximately 6.2 million policies. In a sense, what we did was 
look at it from two different perspectives. The first perspective was that of a 
catastrophic-scenario basis where we took a look at this enormous portfolio of 
risk, given the original coverage perimeters set forth in SB 2902. We ran 
through our model the various earthquake scenarios that were both expected to 
cause the maximum amounts of damage to this portfolio, and more moderate size 
quakes that are higher probabilities of occurrence. And, um, those results are 
included in your reports. we also took a look at this particular portfolio from 
an annual-expected-loss basis, which essentially is what kind of annualized 
losses are expected over time to the Fund given the risk, given the portfolio 
distribution and given the various coverage perimeters. Based on that analysis, 
the average rate that we computed which would cover the annual expected losses, 
and again this is a pure premium rate which does not consider any sort of 
expense allocation because we're in a position to comment on that, was $57 per 
policy on average per year. So that is the work that we performed. I'd be 
happy to discuss the details. 
MR. BIANCO: I'd like - Thank you. I am familiar with your study. You were 
kind enough to make a presentation to all of us. I have very specific questions 
I'd like to ask you. Just so the Committee has it very straight in their mind. 
Your study which we have is, if I'm not mistaken now, the Department of 
Insurance gave you data based on its initial call from 94 insurance companies. 
Is that correct? 
MR. HOLDEN: Uh, correct. I think it was somewhat more than that, I think 
it was 137. 
MR. BIANCO: Well, the document says 94, but I don't care. I'll go with 
with 137, out of approximately how many, 400? 
MR. HOLDEN: It was, it was those ••• Yeah, but it was all those companies 
that sell residential property insurance. 
MR. SHAW: Right. The portion of the personalized market is substantially 
less than the overall industry. 
MR. BIANCO: And then you took that data and you made various assumptions in 
order to come to some kind of a data base that brought the numbers to six and a 
half million homes. Is that - am I saying that correctly so far? 
MR. SHAW: Well actually the assumptions - we had a set of data record by 
record. In fact it's not just based on our computer systems, but we did not -
done an earlier study in the beginning of where we had to make assumptions of 
what the actual portfolio looked like because we didn't have access to all the 
data. The final series of analyses actually used the entire data base to draw 
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our conclusions from. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Did you use the data that was available to you from the 
lending institutions when you talk about the large data base? Is that what you 
mean? 
MR. SHAW: No. We used the data that was provided by the Datacol (??) from 
the Department of Insurance. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Only the Datacol. 
MR. SHAW: Right, only the Datacol. 
MR. BIANCO: All right. And you excluded some 16,000 residences, I believe, 
because of the fact that the data was insufficient for you to consider. Is that 
correct? 
MR. SHAW: There are in any data base, we're looking at approximately 
6.3 million records, there's going to be data in there that's not entirely 
complete, or in some cases even corrupted. So there may - there were certain 
records in there that may have had to have been excluded to perceive the 
analysis, but it was essentially a very minute percentage of the overall 
portfolio. 
MR. BIANCO: And then you took the 6 million residences and you calculated a 
catastrophic earthquake occurring which would have been of what Richter 
magnitude? I think I know the answer, but I'd like you to tell me. 
MR. SHAW: We actually took a look at several. We took a profile - we model 
in our various data bases approximately 227 faults. 
MR. BIANCO: Right. 
MR. SHAW: And we can simulate any number of magnitudes on any one of those 
faults. The largest quake that we simulated was a magnitude 8.3 on the San 
Andreas Northern Segment, which is essentially a replay of the 1906 quake. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. And that produced a catastrophic loss of around 
$10 billion, if memory serves me right. 
MR. SHAW: Gross, about $5 billion falling to the coverage provided by the 
Fund. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. $5 billion. And of the the $5 billion, then you 
annualized it over 20 years. Am I correct? 
MR. SHAW: That was one perspective we took a look at this with. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Under that perspective, then it was a $400 million a year 
annualized loss. Is that right? Go ahead, tell me the probabilistic. Or tell 
everyone else. 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. The methodologies that are used - they're essentially -
when you take a look at risk to earthquake, there's two ways to look at it. One 
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way is what we call a deterministic analysis. Which is, given a portfolio of 
risk, such as the 6.3 million dwellings; given a defined earthquake event, what 
is the scenario losses to that particular event. That is, earthquake occurs, 
what are the losses. That's nice to know for planning purposes, what kind of 
claims that are expected. It does not give you a very good feel for the 
frequency of loss, but just the severity of loss. 
MR. BIANCO: All right. 
MR. SHAW: So we took a completely different look at the risk from the 
perspective of frequency as well as severity, where we employed a what's called 
a probabilistic loss model. Which essentially, on an annual basis, considers 
the possible loss contributions from every fault in the data base, every 
conceivable magnitude that may occur, and essentially aggregate those losses on 
a probabilistic basis. So what we did not do is we did not say the loss in the 
San Andreas situation will be an $8., uh, $10 billion or $5 billion to the Fund 
and divide that by a number of years to come up with $400 million. We actually 
looked at it from a completely different perspective. 
you. 
MR. BIANCO: And that perspective is the 227 faults? 
MR. SHAW: Correct. So ••• 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Now when you did- I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt 
MR. SHAW: Oh, OK. So as yeah- so we took a look at ••• (inaudible) ••• We 
did not make any sort of preconceived decisions on what particular earthquakes 
might occur. We looked at it probabilistically; that is, given a given fault 
which may have a probability of having certain faults over a certain year and 
given each one of those earthquakes occurring, there'll be a certain damage. 
You can sum up all of those particular events probabilistically, sum that 
overall 227 faults and take a look at the losses to your particular portfolio. 
MR. BIANCO: I think I heard what you said, but I'd like to repeat it in my 
words. You tell me if i'm wrong. What you're saying is that you use -
probabilistically you said over a 20-year period 227 faults were going to move? 
Were going to experience an earthquake of some magnitude on them? Is that what 
you've said to me? 
MR. SHAW: Varying probabilities of occurrence over any given time. 
MR. BIANCO: So some might and some might not. San Andreas might move once 
or twice ... 
MR. SHAW: Correct. 
MR. BIANCO: Or not at all. 
MR. SHAW: Or X times. 
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MR. BIANCO: Or X times. Basically does every one fault move in your 
scenario, in your probabilistic scenario? 
MR. SHAW: Well, each particular fault has a probability of a various size 
earthquake occurring over any given time frame. I mean, they might - for 
certain faults it might be quite low, for certain faults it might be quite high. 
MR. BIANCO: I know we have an expert that can talk more about that, but 
just let me ask a quick question right here though. San Andreas: what's the 
probability in your model? My numbers show about every 30 years. Now, what did 
you find? Did you have it move once in 20 years? 
MR. SHAW: Well, I think it's that you're -the perspective that you're 
taking is slightly off, given - it's that we're not looking at fault movement, 
we're looking at probability that certain magnitudes might take place. For 
instance ••• 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
MR. SHAW: ••• we showed in our model there's approximately a three to four 
percent chance in the next 30 years we'll have a replay of an 8.3 magnitude. 
Now the probability of a magnitude 7 is substantially higher and a 6 is even 
greater than that. So when you take a look at losses on an annualized basis, 
you have to consider the entire spectrum of possible magnitudes that might occur 
on each fault over all the faults in the data base. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. I'm sorry to take this time, but I want - so we fully 
understand what you've done here. Now, in saying that then, if you looked at 
the actual Lorna Prieta earthquake loss that took place in 1989, and now I'm 
referring to a document that the reinsurance intermediary sent out, they 
calculate a loss of $144 million, for Lorna Prieta. Now, what did you calculate 
Lorna Prieta? 
MR. SHAW: We've calculated a loss of approximately $700 million for Lorna 
Prieta. 
MR. BIANCO: How? How did you do that? 
MR. SHAW: Well, there are - I guess I - I try not to get too much into the 
depth of the methodology, but essentially ••• 
MR. BIANCO: Well, maybe I should just stop and not do that to the 
Committee. But the thing is, your number is around $700 million. The document 
that has been circulated to reinsurers suggests $144 million. Am I correct? 
MR. SHAW: Urn, I'd have to look at that number. There's a number of 
different numbers that can be associated where the losses are participating, 
but 
MR. BIANCO: We also know that whether you use Assemblymember Areias's 
Page 24 
number of 25,000 homes or other numbers of 18,000 homes and multiply it by even 
$15,000, I don't even think you get at $700 million. But now let's use your 
$700 million for a moment. Have you subtracted - did you assume that that loss 
was based on the enabling legislation's definition of coverage and deductible, 
No. 1? 
MR. SHAW: Correct. Yes. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. You've done no further analysis - You've not been asked, I 
should say, to do any further analysis as it relates to the trailer legislation 
and regulations that further define deductible, etc. Is that yes or no? 
MR. SHAW: We have done a series of what we call sensitivity studies to see 
how various changes in the deductibles of coverage terms insurance would affect 
the total losses, yes. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. If you look at the reinsurance document that's being 
circulated, it's suggesting that we're looking at coverage at 5.5 million 
residences, not 6.5. Do you happen to know why there's a million discrepancy? 
MR. SHAW: No. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Perhaps I can help explain the differences between some of 
these numbers. 
MR. BIANCO: Urn-hum. 
MR. LAWRENCE: My firm was involved in putting these alternate numbers 
together. As I mentioned, I'm with Jardin Insurance Brokers in Los Angeles. 
For many years we've been involved in the purchasing, on behalf of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, the insurance for the Cal Vet program. The Cal 
Vet program in California has represented, over the years, approximately one and 
a half to one percent of the statewide residential population. And the Cal Vet 
program for earthquake insurance was in effect for both Whittier and Lorna Prieta 
earthquakes. In the Whittier earthquake that loss - as I recall, the Cal Vet 
program was about one and a half percent of the state population. That's a 
declining base as loans are paid off. What we did on Whittier, in order to do 
our own estimates of loss, is we took the Cal Vet loans that were in the 
effected zip codes and changed the model to reflect the total population within 
those zip codes, exclusive of Cal Vet, which is not in this program. 
MR. BIANCO: So, to stop you for a second, what you're saying is that his 
.65 million residences included Cal Vet and yours did not? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No, that's -Well, the Cal Vet would be a very small 
difference. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
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MR. LAWRENCE: I mean whether it did or didn't include them because Cal Vet 
is, say, 80,000 residences today. 
MR. BIANCO: I think it's - I think your letter says 70,000, that's OK. 
MR. LAWRENCE: or 70,000 today. And we're talking about six and a half 
residences in the state. It would not be a significant difference, but the main 
reason for the five and a half million is with the evolution of 2902 and the 
finding of the Office of Administrative Law that we cannot - the Department 
cannot put teeth in the mandatory aspects of it, in order to get moving with 
respect to placing of the insurance and reinsurance, we just made an arbitrary 
assumption that 85 percent of the eligible properties would actually be in the 
program. Obviously, that's going to be wrong, high or low. But we had to get 
going in order to try and put insurance in effect. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
MR. LAWRENCE: so that was the reason for this change in numbers. 
MR. BIANCO: So the RMS study figures 100 percent participation and you 
say 85. That's a 5.5 and you've backed out various types of residences that 
would not be eligible. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Correct. 
MR. HOLDEN: I'd like to note that the portfolios are really quite 
different. The Vets Affairs is a home loan program that basically is a 
low-income loan program. There's a limit in terms of the value of houses. I 
think the average value of a house in that program is - Ralph you can correct 
me, but I believe it's in the 80,000 range. Whereas the numbers for the RMS 
portfolio that we did were well over 100,000 - 130,000 I believe. So there is a 
big difference in terms of that. There's also a big difference in terms of 
where those homes are located. Those Vets homes are not located in beautiful 
hillside areas, as well. 
MR. BIANCO: That's fine. I appreciate that, Mr. Holden, but I think the 
Committee, the Subcommittee understands that that's already been backed out of 
the equation. What I do want to know about is whether or not your $700 million 
estimation for Lorna Prieta included - is that loss, and have you backed out of 
that loss any other type of coverage that would reduce the $700 million? Or is 
that, for spare use of a better term, pure loss? 
MR. SHAW: If I can back up just one minute. The $700 million loss actually 
ties quite well with what actually happened. If you'd like to look at the 
actual insured losses that are - the data that's available, excess of deductible 
which is generally a 10 percent deductible, vis a vis quake, the insured claims 
were approximately $3 or $400 million for that piece alone. The piece that the 
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Fund is participating in is the piece essentially filling that deductible gap 
where a vast majority of the losses fall for residential, especially 
wood-framed, dwellings. And so while we don't have a final confirmation on the 
data, the data that we do have suggests that the estimate of $700 million loss 
to the Fund seems to tie quite well with what actually happened back in 1989. 
SENATOR HILL: Is that based on everybody getting the full $15,000? 
MR. SHAW: That is correct. 
SENATOR HILL: But common sense tells you that there were 89 - I means it 
seems to me there was some figure in the neighborhood of $9,000 - that typical 
damage was $9,000. 
MR. SHAW: Correct. That ties quite well with the data we have that shows 
that when you take a look at actual losses collected by the insurance industry, 
$3 to $400 in claims were paid excess of the 15 or 10 percent deductible. 
SENATOR HILL: Um-hum. 
MR. SHAW: So most of the losses under a quake actually are falling in any 
quake, especially wood-framed construction, will fall between essentially 0 and 
approximately 10 percent damage to a structure which is around $15,000 for a 
typical replacement cost structure. so $700 million loss estimate to the Fund, 
if the Fund were in place during the time of the Loma Prieta, of $700 million is 
quite reasonable, actually. 
SENATOR HILL: And that's based on everybody who has a structural damage 
getting the $15,000. 
MR. SHAW: That's everybody who's participating in the program receiving 
full compensation within the perimeters - the coverage terms. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: It is becoming quite apparent to me that what you've done 
with these numbers is you've taken a worse-case scenario. 
MR. SHAW: We've taken a number of scenarios. I mean if you take a look at 
the worse-case scenario which is - would be by our analysis a repeat of the 1906 
quake, we're look at approximately $5 billion of loss to the Fund which would 
require about 15 years to fill up. We took a look at a number of more moderate 
quakes as well. And we took also a look at what the loss would be on an average 
basis on an annual basis. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Did you ask any questions of predictability of earthquakes 
to the experts that are in this field? 
MR. SHAW: Correct. That's all we do 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: And I think that you needed to equate some of that 
knowledge into the predictability of what the quake is going to be. 
MR. SHAW: Correct. Actually, Senator Green, when we - that's why we take a 
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look at the loss from two perspectives. one is this - what we call the scenario 
loss, which is given some relatively severe events, what kind of losses might be 
expected. And that is to a certain degree a high-risk, worse-case type 
perspective. To balance that we also took into the losses on a - what are they 
expected to be on an average annualized basis where we don't necessarily assume 
that these back earthquakes happen. Because when we looked at them on the 
annualized basis and that's where we computed that the annualized losses would 
be approximately $4 - $360 million per year to the fund. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But I might say to you that since 1800 that hasn't 
happened. 
MR. SHAW: Excuse me? 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: That hasn't happened since 1800 by the paper that's in 
front of me. The amount of quake that we've got and we have earthquakes -
record of quakes in this state since 1800. Since 1906 we have kept the damage 
in millions of dollars. And it does not equate to the dollars that you're 
giving us right here at this committee. 
MR. SHAW: OK. Well, it sounds like we're talking at various different 
levels here and we might be referring to the same numbers in different ways. 
SENATOR HILL: Senator Green? 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes. 
SENATOR AREIAS: Can I interject here for a minute? Has the Department of 
Insurance determined which losses are going to be covered and which aren't going 
to be covered yet? Have those regulations been adopted? Have they? 
MR. HOLDEN: Yes. 
SENATOR AREIAS: Which losses are going to be covered and which aren't going 
to be covered? Outline them for me. 
MR. HOLDEN: If your question is have we determined whether certain 
earthquakes will receive coverage and others will not? 
SENATOR AREIAS: No, no, no. Individuals' claims. I mean which claims? 
What types of claims are going to be adopted? Those regulations haven't been 
adopted yet, have they? 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. 
SENATOR AREIAS: OK. Then how can you talk about losses that are going to 
be covered or that there are going to be annual losses to the Fund when we 
don't - when you haven't even adopted regulations that determine which claims 
are going to be accepted and which ones aren't, which are going to be covered 
and which ones aren't? 
MR. HOLDEN: Mr. Areias, I'm sorry, I misspoke. We have adopted 
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regulations. Those are the emergency regulations that were adopted August 30th. 
We will be adopting final regulations and what we cover is structural damage, we 
do not cover contents, and we do not cover habitability expenses. 
SENATOR AREIAS: You mean structural damage. I mean, that's a pretty vague 
and broad term, structural damage. I mean within - under the umbrella of 
structural damage ••• 
MR. HOLDEN: But there's detail in the legislation that says the focus shall 
be on habitability, it's not going to cover sidewalks, driveways, pools, spas, 
fences, ••• 
SENATOR HILL: The cosmetics. That's correct. 
MR. HOLDEN: etc., etc. that kind of ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. I think at this point I'd like to get Lloyd Cluff up 
here to talk about earthquake predictability. If you would come to the rostrum. 
I don't think there's a seat, but there is a microphone right there. 
SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman. I want to make another observation, and that 
is, I've been through this before with these actuaries and I ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So have I. (Laughter.) 
SENATOR HILL: Actuaries are guys who don't have the personality to be 
accountants. (Laughter.) 
Everybody bases some scenario and defends it to the death about how much the 
claims are going to be, whether it's going to be $700 million or $145 million. 
And I guess my question to the Department is I'd like to have the actuaries from 
the Department who created the original program, who came up with the original 
numbers. I'd like to hear their - because they will make an impassioned defense 
about how their numbers held together. And I think the critical point that Mr. 
Bianco was pulling out is that it's all based on what assumptions you put into 
it. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: That's right. 
SENATOR HILL: We're going to have an earthquake, an 8.3 earthquake like the 
1906 earthquake. Here's, you know, it's going to cost us X amount. If we think 
we won't have a Lorna Prieta style quake for three years, this is what we think 
the program's going to cover. Even the assumption that everybody is going to 
get the full $15,000, which we know from our testimony that the average 
structural damage was $8,000. All these different assumptions can come up with 
actuaries who will defend to the death their numbers and I'm positive that under 
their scenarios, they're probably absolutely right. And the question is what 
scenario do you buy into and at that point, you know, what level of payment and 
deductible and surcharge 
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CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I think that's why I made the statement that what I'm 
hearing is the worse-case scenario. 
MR. HILL: Which I understand there's no insurance company in the State 
would be in business if we have that ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: If they use those figures in the industry, they would not 
be insuring. 
MR. SHAW: Excuse me. As far as - I think there's been a bit of 
miscommunication between the two of us on this; i.e., worse-case scenario, 
especially, vis a vis the $15,000. When we did our analyses, we assumed that 
the coverage limits were $15,000, not necessarily that a dwelling would suffer 
$15,000 under a given level of damage. 
SENATOR HILL: OK. 
MR. SHAW: So when we did our analysis we actually tried to model the actual 
loss to that dwelling and then compare that loss to the coverage perimeters, 
deducted out any deductibles and if it exceeded the coverage limits, we maxed it 
out at the $15,000. 
SENATOR HILL: And you estimate that the program ought to be a $57 average? 
MR. SHAW: Based on our analysis, yes. Yes. 
SENATOR HILL: And I guess that's the second part of the frustration. The 
program was initially drafted on a $36 average premium between $12 and $60. 
Commissioner held a press conference several months ago and said "well it has to 
be $119" I remember, "otherwise it's unfunded. But maybe we'll appoint the 
advisory committee and let them go out and look at it." They come back and say 
$51, as I recall. Is that right? Their estimate was it had to be a $51 number. 
Or $25 to $75 during that range. Now I've got a fourth number, $57. And I 
guess one of my questions to the Commissioner would be, you have total authority 
within $12 and $60 to set any rate that you want to. One of the ways to make 
the program actuarially sound, I guess according to even this scenario that has 
been laid out, let's make everybody a $51 average premium- everybody a $57 
premium - charge everybody $57. 
MS. DOLAN: That was an issue that was considered. The recommendations of 
the advisory committee and the Commissioner was that the surcharges should be 
levied based on the risks so that to charge a person in at-low-risk areas a $60 
seemed to be very inequitable to pay for the losses of the high-risk areas. And 
therefore 
SENATOR HILL: But the point is ••• 
MS. DOLAN: ••• we have taken what we thought would be equitable for the 
consumers in California. 
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SENATOR HILL: And so the scenario that you have based this on is based on -
rather than a $60 top premium would be a $75 top premium. Is that right? 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. 
SENATOR HILL: You're asking for $25 to $75. 
MR. HOLDEN: $12 to $75 is what the Commissioner asked for. 
SENATOR HILL: OK. $12 to $75. It was $25 to $75. 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. And the Governor indicated $12 to $75 would be 
more acceptable. 
SENATOR AREIAS: The carrying, you know, carrying that logic out further, 
Senator Mello and I carried the quarter-cent sales tax increase bills which 
raised $800 million. There were people that were non-homeowners that paid their 
quarter-cent sales tax. People that lived in areas with the lowest seismic risk 
in the state paid out their quarter-cent sales tax and we raised the 
$800 million. I mean, we're one State. When there is a major earthquake, 
another earthquake like the Lorna Prieta, people are going to pay one way or 
another. The only question is whether we're going to have this legislative 
mandated program in place as a preparedness vehicle to disperse the money 
expeditiously so that people can get their lives back in order. If it's not, 
then what we're going to do is we're going to trot up here, as Mr. Hill said, 
and raise the sales tax by whatever the necessary amount is so we can match 
whatever Federal funds are available and help people and communities put their 
lives back together. But we're going to be putting the program together again 
ad hoc, new Legislature, with probably little experience in this area, putting 
it together with Band-Aids and bubblegum and nail polish. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Let's hear it from the Seismic Safety Commission at this 
point, and it's Lloyd Cluff who is the predictor of earthquakes. 
MR. LLOYD CLUFF: Yes. I'm Lloyd Cluff with the Seismic Safety Commission. 
I'm an earthquake geologist and have been involved in the two definitive reports 
on forecasting earthquakes that were published under a US Geological Survey 
publication, one in 1988 on the probabilities of large earthquakes occurring on 
the San Andreas Fault system and a publication then on the San Francisco Bay 
Area, 1990, on the probabilities of large earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay 
region. 
So maybe rather than me talking, you could ask me some questions. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: You've heard the testimony today, especially on the 
predictability and basing these rates on the worse-case scenario. From what 
we've heard, would you come to that same conclusion? 
MR. CLUFF: Well, I, uh, I think that was explained, I think, by Mr. Shaw, 
Page 31 
and the difference between using a worse-case deterministic scenario basis 
opposed to a probabilistic method. And I would agree with what I think he said, 
the probabilistic way of modeling this is a much more appropriate way because 
there are certain segments of some of our faults that have a very low likelihood 
of releasing damaging earthquakes and there are others that have a high 
likelihood of releasing damaging earthquakes. And if that is - that input data 
is adequately modeled and then the assumptions that go into looking at the 
consequences of a certain earthquake occurring, that has a high likelihood of 
occurring - if those assumptions are accurate, then you should be able to match 
reality in a probabilistic model. So I support the probabilistic approach 
rather than taking a doomsday approach in assuming that 1906 is going to be 
repeated. our study in this report concluded that the likelihood of that 
earthquake occurring in the next 30 years is less than 2 percent. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So its - to have a magnitude of 8.0 on the Richter scale in 
the next 30 years which is where the high - the $10 billion cost would happen, 
is only 2 percent of the chance of it happening. 
MR. CLUFF: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So when we reach assumptions, then we come to the 
conclusion on the assumption that - then that fund will not be hit that 
heavily - the $10 billion in the next 30 years. 
MR. CLUFF: That's right. The likelihood of that occurring, say, in the San 
Francisco Bay Area is very low. So I would say the one that you should worry 
about is a more likely earthquake which would be a magnitude 6.5 to 7 on say the 
Hayward Fault or the Peninsula segment of the San Andreas, which nevertheless 
would still do a lot of damage, but that would be a more likely one to look at. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But it wouldn't do the kind of damage that a one like in 
1906. Even the Loma Prieta was a 7.1. 
MR. CLUFF: Yes. Right. Uh, of magni - I don't know - I would like to ask 
them some questions, but what's the consequences of, say, a magnitude 7 
earthquake on the northern segment of the Hayward fault. In my judgment that's 
a very likely event and could be extremely catastrophic because that's right in 
the heart of the San Francisco Bay Area. I haven't seen the results. 
SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman. I wonder if we could have the actuaries from 
the Department of Insurance who designed the original program, if they could 
come forward. I mean, I remember going through similar scenarios saying if it's 
this kind of quake, or you don't have, or this magnitude, etc., etc., this is 
what the numbers ought to be. And maybe they could give us the assumption. I'm 
having a tough time figuring out what the difference is. 
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MS. DOLAN: ••• for the next hearing. I would like to say that the data that 
is available because of the datacol (??) that we asked for on each home that we 
thought would be covered is much more extensive and the modeling that we've had 
is a lot more than what was available to our actuary. The other provision, when 
I discussed the issue with him and the Commissioner, about the differences in 
the numbers as they were coming from the various individuals who had done 
projections which were all higher than his, he felt that it was actuarially 
sound based on the assumption that you have pro rata. So we need to be real 
clear about what he was saying, and I think that you certainly were advised by 
him. We actually have gone out, secured new data and hired people who do this 
on a regular basis, but we will make him available. 
SENATOR HILL: You can understand what my frustration is. We could have 
sold this program to the Legislature, to the public at $12 to $75 just as easily 
as $12 to $60. It could have been a $36 average premium or a $51 or a $57 - you 
know, that was not what the debate was through the legislative process, it was a 
philosophical leap of faith for me just in terms of dealing with the whole 
mandated issue. And I became convinced we're going to have another quake, 
people are going to expect the Legislature to act, the television cameras are 
going to be rolling, we're going to race back to Special Session and we're going 
to be giving the money away, and it seemed to me it made sense that in a state 
like California, as opposed to doing what we do where we just, you know, come 
back for three days and try to figure what programs we ought to put together, we 
ought to do what the Federal Government does. There's no special session of 
Congress trying to figure what programs are available for this flood or this 
fire or this earthquake. They have a set program in place. We should have done 
the same thing as well. But my prediction is the further we get away from the 
episode, Mr. Areias is right on target, it gets more difficult when those $12 
and $60 premium notices start going out in January, the public is going to start 
squawking. All of a sudden the Legislature is going to forget about that last 
earthquake. The Commissioner is going to say you're never going to see your 
money anyhow. And to try to then put aside that rainy day or that shaky day 
fund, it gets extremely difficult. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Sal. Do you have a question? 
MR. BIANCO: I just was curious on this probability. Hemet Shaw, correct? 
MR. SHAW: Yes. 
MR. BIANCO: Yeah, I'm looking at an article that appeared in one of the 
Bankers periodicals. And in that article that allegedly you wrote, I guess, you 
indicated Loma Prieta had 18,000 damaged homes. And I'm wondering how you came 
Page 33 
up with - if you - if this is what you wrote and how you came up with that 
number. 
MR. SHAW: The data from the situation in Loma Prieta is sort of a moving 
target, and the 18,000 homes that I mentioned in that article were the best 
understanding we had at the time of the homes that suffered significant damage. 
The actual number now of total homes that were damaged to some degree is more 
like 24,000 or 25,000, from my understanding. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. And I'm curious of this - are you familiar with this chart 
and did you happen to put this in, the one with all the potential earthquakes 
and the probability? Do you know where that ••• 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. That chart was put in by the CBA and it's taken from one 
of the USGS circulars that Dr. Cluff has been discussing. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. I notice that on probability that for the North Coast an 
a. earthquake is less than 10 percent ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: He just said 2 percent. 
MR. BIANCO: This is strictly the North Coast now. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Oh. 
MR. BIANCO: Northern East Bay, a 7. earthquake looks to be somewhere around 
25 or 30 percent, you could correct me if my numbers - is that correct Mr. - How 
close am I, Mr. Cluff, to that? 
MR. CLUFF: 28 percent. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. And Parkfield, which is down in Monterey, for a 6. quake 
is way up there at about 90 percent. Thank you. 
MR. SHAW: Actually the probability assumptions that we use in our model, we 
drew quite heavily upon the studies that we've just heard about from Dr. Cluff 
and both the USGS circulars. And as far as any new studies that become 
available, we attempt to update our models to reflect the latest findings. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I think that one of the issues and one of our questions is: 
how closely did you work with your advisory committee making these 
recommendations? 
MR. HOLDEN: We had the estimates prepared by Risk Management Software, and 
as soon as those were completed we provided those to the advisory committee. We 
had an extensive discussion that day which was, I believe it was September 2nd, 
but it was just prior, in fact I think it was September the 3rd, the same day 
that we provided those estimates to the Legislature, of the implications of the 
different rate scenarios and surcharge scenarios. And their recommendation, I 
know that they are here today so they can speak to that directly, but their 
recommendation was to have a rate range between $45 and $75 and a flat 
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deductible of $2,000. We felt the lower end should be lower than $45 and so 
that is why we drafted the letter suggesting $25 to $75. The Governor felt it 
should be even lower, and given the fact that there are so few properties in 
low-risk zones in California. I'm referring to your district, Assemblyman 
Areias, and other areas that are generally considered low-risk relative to the 
State, we felt that we could accommodate a $12 to $75 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. 
MR. HOLDEN: You're going to tell me about Coalinga. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: No. $100 million worth of damage in Hollister. I 
mean, that's the earthquake epicenter of California. I represent Gilroy and 
Santa Clara County. Now, what part of my district are you talking about, 
Monterey County? 
MR. HOLDEN: Los Banos. The area more on the central Valley. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Right on the San Andreas Fault. 
MR. HOLDEN: Well, I don't know if Los Banos - is Los Banos - I don't 
believe it's right on the San Andreas Fault. But there are certain parts of 
your district, if I understand it correctly, that are more Central Valley that 
are considered low-risk, both in terms of the loss estimates that were provided 
in terms of the Uniform Building Code which estimates risk for California and 
has a lot of that area as zone 3 as opposed to zone 4. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But you did pacify the Commission and that was their 
recommendation? 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right. 
Why don't we leave this subject unless there are any further questions. I 
think we've hit this around a bunch. And let's get into reinsurance. 
I guess, if you want me to start with a question and we need to know your 
method of selecting some reinsurance and consortium on what basis did you 
exclude bidders based upon price and coverage and etc. and etc.? 
MR. HOLDEN: With regard to reinsurance, we consulted with the State's 
Office of Risk and Insurance Management which is in the Department of General 
Services. We consulted with them because we knew that they had in fact arranged 
the reinsurance for the Department of Veteran Affairs' Cal Vet program, and they 
had been in the market on a number of occasions purchasing excess insurance or 
reinsurance for that program. So they had a long experience in purchasing and 
in fact as you all know, the Cal Vet does have an earthquake insurance program 
with a low deductible. So that was our first step. We went with them and they 
were, in fact, involved throughout the process of designing the program, 
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providing input on claims adjusting, providing input on reinsurance in a number 
of areas. We subcontracted with that office and through an interagency 
agreement. In addition we brought on board the former State Risk Manager, Gene 
Marquart, who had been instrumental in setting up many of these coverages, and 
we asked them to develop a process that we could purchase reinsurance. 
And what I'd like to do now is turn it to the chief of that office, the 
Office of Insurance and Risk Management, and he can tell you a little bit about 
the process. I believe we've provided some charts at the last hearing about the 
structure of that and he will detail that for you. 
MR. RALPH MAURER: Briefly, the Office of Risk and Insurance Management is 
the insurance procurement branch for state government. And over the years we do 
get involved in purchasing a variety of insurance for - We either go out to bid 
or by negotiated placement, place the insurance with the various brokers 
throughout the State. With this particular program, being the largest insurance 
program we've ever been involved in, we determined that the best course of 
action was to use our third option that we frequently go to and that's to 
establish a consortium of brokers which is what we did. We recommended that to 
the Insurance Commissioner. We went out to the nine largest international 
brokerage houses, invited them to give us their proposals on how they would work 
together on a consortium to establish the procurement process for this program. 
We selected four of the nine to be on the consortium, the lead broker being 
Jardin with Larry Lawrence. And in addition to Jardin was Alexander and 
Alexander, Marsh and McClinnon (??), and Johnson and Higgins, very large and 
well-respected insurance brokerage houses. They in turn took over the marketing 
of the program, have been packaging it, preparing it, came back with a plan to 
us and the Department of Insurance, recommending that the reinsurance be handled 
through E.W. Blanch (??) on the domestic, Alexander Howdin (??) on the foreign 
markets, and including Bauering (??) on the excess market. Essentially, from 
that point on it's in the hands of the consortium and Larry Lawrence, as the 
chair of the consortium, is working on it. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Question. Reinsurance is reinsurance. How did you 
approach it? Did you approach it from the $15,000 deductible, I mean the policy 
itself? Or did you reinsure the Fund, itself? And then what was your 
deductible to the Fund? 
MR. MAURER: The plan that came back from the consortium - and maybe I 
should defer to Larry on this - basically is to the Fund, not the individual. 
And the plan that came back from the consortium was that we initially opt for a 
self-insured retention of $150 million to the State, and that we consider 
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purchasing various levels of excess and reinsurance above the $150 million 
retention. And that is the plan that came back from the consortium which we and 
the Department of Insurance 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So you worked on an assumption of $150 million deductible, 
basically is what you're talking about. 
MR. MAURER: To the Fund. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: To the Fund, itself. And what kind of dollars was that 
premium as far as that umbrella policy. 
MR. MAURER: Larry, I'll let you respond to that. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Senator Green. As I recall, the - we're in the market now 
looking for $350 million excess of that $150 million retention or deductible. 
And the budget that we're operating on for that $350 million is in the area of 
$40 million, premiums. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So for $300 million you're going to be paying $400 million, 
or $40 million. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Correct. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: And that would take - would make your Fund whole up to 
$450 million, counting the retention. 
MR. LAWRENCE: That's right. If we could anticipate that we wouldn't have 
more than one major loss in a given year, the Fund could sustain that loss of 
$150 million and still come out whole at the end of the year after paying 
reinsurance and operating expenses. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. This equates in my mind to a 10 percent cost of what 
has been said here today. We're talking a $400 million pool. Ten percent of 
that's $40 million, and so you would then have $360 million plus your insurance. 
And it would have to get over for the first year, in other words, we would have 
this coinsurance. The Fund actually would only be at risk up to $150 million. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Assuming we can get the insurance in effect, that is correct 
Senator. 
Also, the thing that perhaps I should mention is $400 million now has been 
used quite regularly and I've had the premium to the Fund be something of a 
moving target. We're estimating less than that because of the 85 percent 
assumptions with respect to this mandatory issue and the actual number of 
residences and the actual rate. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: But, if it's 100 percent, is it $400 million, right, if 
it's a mandatory program? 
MR. HOLDEN: We're basing our estimates on the rates that we've set and 
100 percent and under those two assumptions, it's $313 million. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: OK. The rates - which rates. 
MR. HOLDEN: Those are the rates between $12 and $60 that are based on risk 
that we adopted and sent out to the insurers in October. 
Just a note, Senator Green. We have authorized the consortium to go out for 
$350 million and they are in the process in securing that so that it is 
effective January 1, 1992. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. So you have moved in that direction to have a 
coinsurance. And you feel there is an availability of that $350 million? 
MR. LAWRENCE: We feel that at least $200 million is available, but we'll 
know a lot more in another couple of weeks, because we're in the market very 
actively now, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. Sal. 
MR. BIANCO: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions to ask. 
The first one is, perhaps Mr. Lawrence or Mr. Holden can answer it. This is 
a letter dated November 12 from the consortium regarding the primary insurance 
layer, that's the $350 million I assume we're talking about, that went out. Are 
you familiar with the correspondence? 
MR. LAWRENCE (??): Got a letter from me, yeah. 
MR. BIANCO: It's actually from Johnson and Higgins, from Mr. Shebert? 
MR. LAWRENCE: I don't know the subject of that letter. 
MR. BIANCO: Well, let me tell you what the letter says. This is a letter: 
"We are pleased to enclose specs for the caption 'Residential Catastrophic 
Earthquake Risk'. Enclosures include extensive underwriting data, etc. Please 
pay special attention to the insuring terms and coverage definitions contained 
in this package. 
We seek your net authorization only, excluding treaty or facultative 
reinsurance, in the primary layer of coverage of $100 million excess of 
$150 million self-insured fund retention. The rate on line is 14.6 percent or 
$146,000 per million of limit. 
Despite some controversy surrounding this program, the broker consortium has 
a firm order from the Department of Insurance to proceed with this placement to 
be effective January 1, 1992, unless deferred by further legislation or 
administrative action. Accordingly, we seek your prompt attention and ask you 
to advise us by November 27 your firm or provisional authorization. 
We are asking all companies writing significant California volume to 
participate in this program and the State has indicated they will track program 
participation. 
Please give this proposal your most favorable consideration both from an 
Page 38 
underwrited view and a corporate 'fair share' participation." 
The questions that - and that's the extent of the letter and it has a number 
of interesting attachments - but the first question is, would any of you know 
how someone came to the conclusion in this letter that the program could be 
delayed, could be deferred by further legislation or administrative action? 
Where that may have come from? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Perhaps I can answer that. The - not the language of that 
letter which I'm not familiar with -but we were anxious to get into the market 
and begin working on actually placing the insurance. And it seemed like one of 
the reasons that we weren't given authorization to proceed was that it was 
possible that there would be some Special Session to defer the implementation of 
the law, as there was in July. At least, we had that impression, and so in 
order to eliminate that as a problem, we felt we could structure the actual 
placement to take effect on January 1, or in the event that there was a deferral 
of the law, the later date, whichever was subsequent to the other, just to get 
moving on the program. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: ( ••• inaudible ••• ) Have you done that? 
MR. HOLDEN: Yes we have. We did draft a letter just following that hearing 
and I believe you - we also drafted a letter which went to the Legislature 
indicating the same thing, which you should have received. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: The next point. We were put - well, we had the Caucus here 
a couple weeks ago and put on notice that the probability of a Special Session 
after the first week in December. I now have notification from the Rules 
committee that the probability of a Special Session is pretty nil. So it's 
the - having the Legislature act, unless the Governor or the Assembly and the 
Senate getting together requesting a session, it's not going to happen. So, we 
have to go on that assumption, that there's not going to be a Special Session of 
this Legislature on this issue particularly. 
MR. HOLDEN: We are proceeding on the assumption that the program takes 
effect January 1. That's why we've authorized reinsurance coverage to take 
effect January 1. That's why we're proceeding with our system development and 
that's why we're still trying to hire staff. 
MR. BIANCO: Mr. Chairman. I'm wondering if it would be appropriate if you 
would want to ask the Department to answer for us what - for them to find out 
for the person who wrote the letter representing the broker consortium what 
"further delay by administration action" means - what they meant by that? 
MR. HOLDEN: We'll be glad to check on that. We have not given them any 
direction to delay any of the activity. You know, it may reflect the fact that 
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they saw things in the media and insurers have been interested in delaying it. 
MR. BIANCO: That's fine. I was just kind of curious ••• 
MR. HOLDEN: But we will check on that and get back to you. 
MR. BIANCO: In the document, you may want to look at the following points. 
I will be happy to make you a copy if you don't have one. It mentions for 
purposes of direct physical laws that it includes damage to structure and debris 
removal. And I'm wondering if you might be able to tell us later where 'debris 
removal' came as part of the coverage as it relates to direct physical loss. 
You don't have to answer it right now, that's just fine. 
It also, in the document, indicates that we're talking about privately-owned 
single-family residential structures, individually-owned condos, two-unit 
residential structures, etc. There's no mention about the discussion later in 
the agenda as it relates to condominium associations and owner-owned which 
thereby are rented. So I am assuming from this document that they are covered 
under the program, but we know that there is some discussion about some of those 
not being covered under the program. The only exclusion, according to the 
definition of residential property, is single-family structure rented for 
individual residential purposes. And I know that's different than a condo 
definition. 
The document also talks about revenue base and annualized revenue using a 
$55 annual average premium. Different than $57 that we heard just a little 
while ago, so there must be some - I don't know if there's some new numbers that 
have been kicked around. 
MR. HOLDEN: Larry, is that $55 85 percent of $60? Or do you have any idea? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. At one of the meetings when the rates were still in 
development, it was suggested that the average rate with many of - the high 
percentage as I understand the contemplation was, would be at $60. There would 
be smaller numbers at lesser figures and it was felt, during the developmental 
phase, that perhaps a rate of $55 on average, between $60 and whatever the 
lowest rates are, might be appropriate. That's where the $55 came from. The 
$57 is an actuarial loss estimate only. It's a different kind of a number. 
MR. BIANCO: I have one more question on this letter and then, Mr. Chairman, 
just one further question on reinsurance in general, if its permissible. 
In this document, there is a detail of various findings and losses and it 
indicates it's based on the RMS study, with an 85 percent participation with the 
various alternatives. Now on Loma Prieta, they're calculating an alternative 1: 
$141 million loss; Loma Prieta alternative 2: $142 million; Whittier $234, one 
alternative, that's in the millions; and Whittier narrows alternative 2 with 
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$234 million. I'm wondering if you might be able later to tell - find out for 
us where this came - where these numbers came from. You don't have to do it 
right now, it's not ••• 
MR. HOLDEN: Yeah. Since we haven't seen that, we can't speak to anything 
that's in there. I take it this was something that was by the, by a consortium 
member that was sent out to 
MR. BIANCO: It went out to apparently every insurance company around. For 
purposes of them agreeing to purchase - help with reinsurance. 
MR. HOLDEN: I'm assuming they correctly cited the RMS numbers and those are 
the only numbers that are ours. 
MR. BIANCO: The last point, if I can. What about financial reinsurance, 
and I want to, for a moment, go back to the legislative briefing and a one-page 
document that we saw but didn't get a copy of. Where you showed the three 
layers. And there was a third layer, if memory serves me right, which was 
financial reinsurance. Maybe you could touch on that for a moment? 
MR. HOLDEN: Um, financial reinsurance is, I think, something that you have 
discussed quite a bit, Senator Green, and we undertook an analysis of financial 
reinsurance within the Department, a review of that. We have had some concerns 
with certain insurance companies' use of financial reinsurance because it's not 
a true risk transfer insurance. But our analysis was really confined to what 
good would financial reinsurance do us in terms of building the Fund. 
And I'd like to, if I could, just take the example that you had cited, 
Senator Green, before on the ability to get $2 billion worth of financial 
reinsurance with the $250 million-a-year premium. Now, financial reinsurance is 
really a line of credit and as such, once you access that reinsurance product, 
you begin a repayment schedule. If we were to access - and we have some figures 
which are provided in the handout that we have given you on page three - if you 
would access $1 billion or one half of that $2 billion financial reinsurance, 
then it would then trigger annual repayment amounts. And I will have to defer 
to Larry on this, but I would expect most insurers would want repayment within a 
short period of time. I've calculated based on five to ten years, I don't know 
if that's correct or not, but I assume it would be a short period of time. If 
that is correct, then the annual repayments would be $136 million to 
$250 million, depending on the interest rate that you choose. Therefore, you 
would have payments that greatly exceed the resources of the fund. And in fact 
homeowners in the future would end up paying their surcharge to pay back this 
financial reinsurance without any reasonable expectation that they might receive 
anything from the Fund. I say that because the annual premium is $250. If you 
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access the $1 billion, then you will pay between $136 and $250 more. So, in 
other words, you're up to $386 to $500 million per year, which, as we've 
testified earlier, is more than the resources of the fund. 
The other thing about financial reinsurance is since it is a line of credit, 
there is a cost associated with setting it up, and it's a significant cost. 
Larry Lawrence can talk about that some more. In addition, the repayment of the 
financial reinsurance will involve some spread, we will pay back at an interest 
rate. Hard to estimate what that would be, but we will pay that back and that's 
part of the repayment schedule. We believe that if the Legislature wants to go 
with a line of credit approach, which is really what financial reinsurance is 
and really what revenue bonds are, that it in fact makes a lot more sense to 
establish a pool of money investment account line of credit. We will be - we 
will not need it until we need it. That means that we will not have to pay that 
set-up charge for it, that annual premium for it. And in addition, when we pay 
it back, it's very likely that we will pay back at rates that are much better 
than we would expect to pay a financial reinsurer. So we see it really as a 
much better option to provide the same thing. And that line of credit could be 
used to underfill the reinsurance in the event that we don't have enough money. 
But we do have concerns about developing a debt service payment scheme over 
many years that homeowners would end up paying a portion of their surcharge 
really just to retire the debt of the losses from a large event. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I don't know where you got it it your head that I was 
suggesting a financial scenario. I was suggesting to you as I've gone through 
the experience of joint powers insurance authority that I helped found, an 
umbrella policy or treaties with actual insurance. As far as the financial is 
one of the things that you can do, it's a tool available to you. I no way 
suggested that that's what you should do. 
MR. HOLDEN: Well, forgive my assumption then. And I think in terms ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I don't know how it could be assumed when I've equated it 
to Lloyds of London. They are not a financial group, they are an insurance 
group and they are underwriters writing treaties. And this is what I've told to 
and what I equated back to when I made those statements. 
MR. HOLDEN: Larry is involved in the market. He can speak to the market 
much better than I can. The only thing that I can do before I give it to him is 
reference that there is an article in your packet from Business Insurance that 
indicates that the market has shrunken considerably. Some experts estimate 
there may only be $150 to $180 million worth of reinsurance. We're obviously 
trying to get more than that and, you know, we will continue those efforts. But 
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perhaps you could talk about the market, what your assessment is of available 
capacity. 
MR. LAWRENCE: All right. Thank you, Richard. 
As you know, we've had discussions with other major brokers as well as with 
leading reinsurance brokers throughout the country and in other places in the 
world. Our estimate at this time is that in today•s environment, and the 
environment does change in our business regularly, but in today•s environment 
that probably the very most that we can hope to implement, and almost without 
regard to price, is $350 million. Because at this point, price doesn't seem to 
have a big impact on the amount of capacity that's available. It may have been 
that, in fact for certain, that there were higher limits available in past, in 
the past, but the reinsurance business has had one of the largest losses in 
their history over the last 18 months and it has constricted the market, 
particularly in Lloyds. The foreign market is very, very restricted. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Sal? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes, thank you. Just a couple of points that perhaps you might 
want to bring out that you haven't done so yet for the Committee in terms of 
delineation. 
When we talk about a restricted reinsurance market, are we not talking about 
the fact that one of the things that is also occurring, that this program is a 
single-peril program. It is not a multi-peril program. And if that's not the 
case, then why not? In terms of the differentiation and the ability to spread 
risk. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Sal, you're absolutely right. One of the complications of 
this program is that it's earthquake only. Many underwriters that have broad 
authority for property types of insurance can write earthquake insurance as part 
of a fire insurance policy, say on a multi-million dollar office structure. 
They do it every day, it's no problem. But their authority does not extend to 
earthquake-only placements. And when you have an earthquake-only contract to 
negotiate, then very often you have to deal with completely different people, 
you have to deal with home-office levels and the like of that, and it slows down 
the procedure and limitations come into play. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Let me read a paragraph out of Business and Insurance and 
it's November 4, '91, which is pretty current. And it says "despite the 
decrease in reinsurance capacity, the earthquake insurance program for insured 
property owners in New Zealand obtained $570 million in catastrophic coverage", 
and that's during April 1 renewals and the same coverage it had the previous 
year. He said the program is believed to be the largest single catastrophic 
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reinsurance placement in the world. Maybe we're just a little too late with 
what we're doing here. other people can be doing it. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Senator, on that point. That earthquake program in New 
Zealand is a very interesting program because of its similarity to what we have 
here. That is, a billion New Zealand dollars, excess of a billion-dollar 
deductible that the New Zealand fund retains. The distinction between that 
program and this program is that that's been in effect for quite a few years and 
it's in the renewal, ongoing mode, whereas we're creating this one from scratch 
and it's a little different. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, maybe our deductible should be a billion dollars 
then. Because we can handle a billion dollars rather than $150 million. Maybe 
we've picked the wrong deductible to fund our coinsurance program. That's the 
first question that comes to mind. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I believe part of the deductible had to do with the fact that 
while the Fund's resources were building up, if a deductible were negotiated 
which would protect the assets of the Fund during the developmental years, that 
there was a value to that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But you have to pay a price for that, and then you end up 
not getting the coinsurance which you're looking for. 
AREIAS' AIDE: I just have a quick question. When you say you're speaking 
with major brokers and reinsurers, can you be a little more specific with who 
you're talking to? 
MR. LAWRENCE: The brokers that we consult with on this are the three other 
consortium brokers which is Marsh and McLennan (SP??) which is the largest 
broker in the world, Alexander and Alexander which I think is number 2, Johnson 
and Higgins which is 3rd or 4th, depending on who's telling the story. Our 
position, I believe, is 8th internationally. And the reinsurance brokers that 
are in this program are EW Blanche, they are the 2nd largest in the United 
States. They do $1.5 billion in annual premiums. And the foreign intermediary 
is Howden Reinsurance, which I think is the 2nd largest reinsurance brokerage 
internationally. So these are all people that have their pulse well tuned in to 
the market place, I think. 
MR. BIANCO: May I follow up with that? A couple of things. First off, 
although you named those entities off, what about the others. And in 
particular, the four bidders that did not win the award. Does anyone tell us 
why they're not being consulted with? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Well Sal, you know as part of that process, we - as we went 
through a request for proposal to the Department of Insurance, we requested 
Page 44 
proposals from what we felt were the leading reinsurance brokers in the United 
States. We evaluated them and came up with two. And the reason we came up with 
two is it's cumbersome to work with more than that. 
MR. BIANCO: Was it all based upon cost of service or line? One rate? 
MR. LAWRENCE: It was based upon - I'd say the key issues were - the cost of 
their services was certainly an important factor. But again, I would say the 
most important factor was what we perceived was their attitude of the program 
and what we thought would be their aggressiveness in doing the job because this 
is a very difficult program to market. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Mr. Chairman. A follow-up question. Touching a little 
bit on Senator Green's point about New zealand and following up with yours. 
Isn't it not correct though, New Zealand is not a single-peril program, but a 
multi-peril program? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Sal, I really can't say for sure. But the only part of the 
program that's been discussed with me is the similarity with respect to the 
earthquake. 
MR. BIANCO: Then I'm wondering to what extent, this goes back to the 
Department, has the Department and the Department of General Services that was 
involved in the bidding process, looked at all - or did you look at all at the 
possibility of the State of California allowing some of its self-insurance as it 
relates to some of its perils that it is currently self-insuring become 
available for purposes of a multi-peril program, thereby reducing the cost of 
this single-peril coverage. 
MR. MAURER: No we didn't, and I don't think it would match up. But, that 
was not considered. 
MR. BIANCO: Is there a reason why it wasn't considered? Knowing 
MR. MAURER: The programs are very dissimilar, I don't think that they 
would've, uh, they would've matched up. 
MR. BIANCO: Well, I guess if I put it a different way. We know that the 
State of Cali - correct me if I'm wrong - there are two programs in particular 
that where the State utilizes - they're not necessarily self-insurers - that's 
the bridges CalTrans, and the Cal Vet program. Are there any other 
programs that the State of ·California could divorce itself from from a 
self-insured process that would be a pearl which could be covered just as in 
homeowners coverage, insurance companies do the same thing? 
MR. MAURER: No. The State is basically uninsured for almost all of its 
property and liability. We don't - we buy very little insurance, in fact. 
MR. BIANCO: That's what I'm pointing out. But, are there, to your 
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knowledge, are there any risks that the State is currently self-insured, of 
which there are all of them but two, if I'm correct, that could become an 
insured risk? 
MR. MAURER: If you wanted to insure the State buildings? Is that what 
you're aiming towards? 
MR. BIANCO: We have lots of risk. I'm not picking one over the other. 
MR. MAURER: It's not cost effective for us to buy insurance. 
MR. BIANCO: It's not cost effective? To what extent was there a 
cost-effect analysis done in terms of the purchase of reinsurance for this 
program as a single-peril program versus this program being a multi-peril 
program? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Sal, may I answer that question? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes. 
MR. LAWRENCE: One of the considerations that the brokerage consortium went 
through as specifications were being put together addressed this specific point. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
MR. LAWRENCE: To consider making it a multi-peril program which included 
quake, and to thereby perhaps loosen up some underwriting markets that might be 
difficult to access, the conclusion that we came to - and it wasn't done just 
within the brokerage, we discussed this with some major underwriters to get 
their feeling for it - the conclusion was that this program is so highly visible 
that it is an earthquake program regardless of what you call it and regardless 
of the policy form that you put together to insure it. And as such, the normal 
access that you'd have on a multi-peril or a difference-in-conditions policy 
would not make any difference as far as the availability of reinsurance or 
excess insurance. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. So what you're saying to us is that because we intend to 
cover 6-1/2 million individual residences, therefore there's a total spread of 
risk for the entire State where no area is left uncovered, it is truly a 
single-peril program and no matter what you do, there is no way that you can in 
any way mix your book of business to make it easier. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Not any significant way. 
MR. BIANCO: No significant way. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right. Anything else on this issue? OK, we've covered 
it quite well, and so why don't we go into bonds? What's the status of the 
advisory committee for the bonds? And has the committee made any 
recommendations on the type of bonds and have you begun working with the 
Treasurer's office? And there has to be regulations on this also. And I guess, 
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is your department going to request any changes in legislation in the future in 
trailer bills? 
MR. HOLDEN: Yes. Senator Green, we have been pursuing the bond issue. We 
have had a number of discussions with the State Treasurer's office regarding the 
issuance of bonds and the result of those discussions from them is that 
marketing bonds that would be repaid by the proceeds from this program would be 
very difficult because of the uncertainty in the revenue stream that would pay 
the debt service payments. Although there is language in the legislation which 
does say that the proceeds to the Fund - the revenues to the Fund would go to 
debt service payments, they feel that in fact the uncertainty of the revenue 
stream, the fact that the authorizing legislation has a term basically of five 
years in which the Commissioner is to come back, re-evaluate the program and 
make recommendations as to continuation of the program, are all factors that 
complicate the comfort of bond holders or bond purchasers, if you will. 
Secondly, and this was unknown to us last year when we began the budget 
process for this program, the cost of issuing bonds is at least two percent of 
the issue amount. So an issue of a $1 billion bond would cost, right off the 
top, $20 million. In addition, there's the financing cost of those bonds. And, 
again, we believe that a better approach to do the same type of - provide the 
same kind of cash flow remediation would be to use a pooled money investment 
account line of credit. We think it would be cheaper, it would be there when we 
needed it, and it would serve the same function. Would also be the delay in 
time that would be associated with bonds which the Treasurer's office has 
estimated would be nine months after beginning the process. And that would 
probably be complicated by the fact that we haven't yet received one dime in 
surcharges. I would imagine that they would recommend - I don't know if they 
are here or listening - I imagine that they would recommend that we begin that 
process after we begin to receive surcharges, when we know what our proceeds 
really are. 
So, we have begun the process but we have not gotten very positive readings 
from the Treasurer's office on the marketability of these bonds, or the cost. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: It was my understanding that there was, in the legislation, 
there was a bond advisory committee to be put in place. Have you done that? 
MR. HOLDEN: The bond committee is established in statute and it's the 
typical committee that's set up whenever you have bonds. This one is composed 
of the Insurance Commissioner, the State Treasurer, the State Controller, and 
the Director of Finance. We don't have a bond package for them, and there's no 
reason to bring them together at this time. 
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CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I would think one of the reasons to bring them 
together is to get some advice on should you issue bonds or not and a 
comparison. Those are your financial people and they should be giving you the 
financial advice. 
MR. HOLDEN: We are preparing some materials which is one of the requested 
studies, and I believe it was your requested study, that we look at the 
utilization of bonds as a way of building the Fund. And we are, in fact, in the 
process of doing that study and we will take that to our advisory committee. 
We, in fact, have taken the outline of the study to the advisory committee and 
gotten their input. And we have started that process. And I think the due date 
for that study is January 1. So we have been looking very seriously at bonds, 
but the indication was different than we thought it would be and I suspect 
different than you had imagined also. We will continue with that bond 
utilization and study and see what results we get. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: The whole insurance package is different than I visualized. 
Go ahead. 
AREIAS' AIDE: Richard. Have you solicited a formal opinion from the 
Treasurer with regard to revenue bonds, the mandatory issue, or use of a PMIA? 
Where is she at on this? 
MR. HOLDEN: They have indicated 
AREIAS' AIDE: Is there a formal position from the Treasurer? 
MR. HOLDEN: No. Not that we know of. We ••• 
AREIAS' AIDE: Why not? 
MR. HOLDEN: Why is there not a formal position? I can't respond for them. 
AREIAS' AIDE: Have you requested one? 
MR. HOLDEN: We have talked to them about use of a line of credit. And 
they've advised us that there's really two routes. One you can go to the Pooled 
Money Investment Board and request a line of credit and the other is statutory. 
When you take a request to the Pooled Money Investment Board, they will want 
to look at our ability to repay that line of credit once an event occurs. 
Statutory solution is highly superior to a request. 
AREIAS' AIDE: But the Treasurer has not provided a formal recommendation 
with regard to this issue to the Commissioner. 
MR. HOLDEN: Not a formal recommendation, just discussions. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I don't think that you can put a package together with one 
part of the puzzle in place. One part of the puzzle is bonds, one part is 
reinsurance, and one part is a line of credit. And I believe that you have to 
use all of those tools to make your Fund whole. And, now, I would hope that you 
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would look at that approach because you're going to have to take some innovative 
financing to make that Fund whole so that this program will work. 
MR. HOLDEN: We'll continue to look at that, and I've shared with you our 
preliminary results on that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. Thank you. 
OK. Sal, do you have something on the bonds? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes, just one question. This deals with the revenue stream and 
the uncertainty of it. In the big red binder that we handed out, in Roman 
Numeral No. 8, it's the - it contains the October 31 letter from the Department 
to all the insurers, and attached are the technical requirements for the career 
fund. In particular, on Page 13 of that document - I want you to get a chance 
to look at it, Richard - No. 5.5, the Earthquake Event Submissions. This is 
where the Commissioner may request a special surcharge submission to be sent 
within 10 calendar days immediately following the conclusion of a qualifying 
earthquake event, as designated by the Department. "The event submission is 
identical to a regularly monthly submission with one exception: the event 
submission will cover only the activity occurring from either the last regularly 
monthly surcharge submissions or the last event submission, whichever occurs 
last, the day immediately preceding the date of the start of the earthquake 
event. In the case of submission or detailed transaction rejection, 10 business 
days will be allowed to submit corrections unless a written request for 
extension has been approved by the Fund." What that seems to say to me is that 
we have a qualifying event and as a result the Commissioner can call for a 
submission from the insurer based upon the date of its last submission, i.e., 
the money it collected on a surcharge. Am I correct so far in what I'm 
understanding there? 
MR. HOLDEN: Let me clarify submission. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. 
MR. HOLDEN: There's a data submission and there's a money submission. This 
refers to a data submission. 
MR. BIANCO: A data submission. Have you ever thought of having a money 
submission? 
MR. HOLDEN: We did think of it, and in fact, I think we did put that in our 
emergency regs and OAL disapproved that. They - in discussions with them, they 
said "No, you only have authority to receive it at the end of the month. You 
don't have authority to receive the emergency money." 
MR. BIANCO: Let's take a second on that, if we can Mr. Chairman? 
I don't think that's necessarily a bad idea relative to a special event 
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submission, so I'm wondering, would- when you were thinking about this, were 
you looking at that in terms of additional dollars coming into the Fund at that 
particular time? 
MR. HOLDEN: What it really is is not any additional moneys over and above 
what's forecasted, it's just an estimate of what funds have been collected by 
insurers so that we can base our Fund balance for purposes of prorata on. 
MR. BIANCO: And also your report to the Legislature in terms of the status 
of the Fund. 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Do you feel comfortable that with the new draft 
regulations that are scheduled to take effect next year that this technical 
requirement as currently spelled out can in fact take place from a data point of 
view? I mean if OAL's not going to say anything about this? 
MR. HOLDEN: They have not said anything so far. I don't think this 
specific recommenda - specific language is in the regulations. 
MR. BIANCO: Oh, that's fine. I'm not saying it has ••• 
MR. HOLDEN: What it says is other information requested by the 
Commissioner. 
MR. BIANCO: But for purposes of looking to the future for this Fund and 
specifically needing legislative statutory authority so you don't have a problem 
with proposed follow-up regulations in terms of dollar transmission. Is that 
something that you think we ought to look to in our deliberations? 
MR. HOLDEN: Providing specific authorization for this? 
MR. BIANCO: And I'm thinking in particular the fact that the burden that's 
been placed on the Commissioner in the enabling legislation in terms of 
reporting to the public, and to the Legislature and Governor, the status of the 
Fund and how the value of that monetary event transmission may assist you in 
being as accurate as possible and being able to pay claims to the best of your 
ability. 
MR. HOLDEN: It's possible that it would provide more accurate information. 
It would be nice if we had the cash in hand, of course, and we would earn 
interest on that cash during that period of time. So, it would be helpful. I 
think we're prepared to go with it the way it is because what we really need is 
to know what money is available that we can calculate. I think the increment in 
interest would be small having calculated it, would be small. 
MR. BIANCO: But the actual dollar figure - the actual dollars without the 
interest earned is still something that's worthwhile. Is that what I heard you 
just say to me? Or you didn't say that? What did you say? Please help me, I'm 
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lost. 
MR. HOLDEN: Well, it's always better to have money in the bank than to be 
counting on it coming. 
MS. DOLAN: It's a matter of cash flow, essentially. The early reporting is 
for the proration. The amount, the interest on, depending on when the event 
occurred in the month. It may not be worth the hassle in terms of overcoming 
the objections. 
MR. BIANCO: OK. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right. Then let's get in the next issue. And I think 
on this one I'd like to bring the insurers up here to have the input. This is 
program delay and I think this is - there's been a lot of people speak to me on 
this issue so if the insurers will come up forward. 
OK. And I think the overall, and this is the main question: Is there a 
need for further delay of the program and why? And this includes problems with 
compliance, regulations, and data submission requirements. All of these kind of 
good things has kind of been alluded to here today. So, you want to start with 
the Commissioner's office and then we'll go to the insurers. 
MR. HOLDEN: I'd just like to point out, in terms of the regulations, we in 
fact did adopt regulations consistent with law. The Commissioner adopted the 
regulations, emergency regulations, as required on August 30, in fact two days 
before the SB 289 deadline. And although we understand that the insurers and 
their advocates may have preferred to have 120 days from the date of final 
regulations, they must have been aware that language in SB 289 stipulated 
emergency regulations. In addition, the Department requested and received the 
input of several insurance associations prior to adoption of emergency 
regulations, so these participants were fully aware of the Department's 
compliance with the September 1, 1991, requirement to adopt emergency rather 
than final regulations. 
I think - we've had a number of discussions with them regarding data 
submission requirements and have tried to the extent possible to accommodate the 
varied systems that they have. we are dealing with approximately 200 different 
insurers and many of them have very different data systems that we have tried to 
accommodate while still maintaining what we believe is the integrity of the 
system that we think is required. 
And then finally, a surcharge rate matrix was sent to the insurers 
October 4, so that they could begin programming. The actual rates were sent on 
the 16th and then again on the 24th when an error, a data error was detected in 
the October 16th submission, which changed some of the rates. 
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We are sympathetic to the insurers' concerns about bringing up their systems 
in a very short period of time. We have to do that ourselves. And I think they 
are the best spokespeople for that. And I will just defer to them on that 
issue. 
We feel we have a statutory January 1, 1992, deadline. We have to try and 
meet that the best we can. We've tried to work with them on it, and I think 
we've made some accommodations. But nonetheless, it is a statutory deadline 
and we are working towards that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Any questions? OK. Who's going to start it off? 
MR. RON GASS: My name is Ron Gass. I'm here for the American Insurance 
Association. 
I guess I want to start off by saying that our companies are making their 
best effort to comply with the requirements of the California Residential 
Earthquake Recovery Fund. I think that, as the Chairman may understand, it 
requires enormous amount of effort, both in terms of manpower and dollars, to 
reprogram our systems to match what the Fund would like. I think that it was no 
secret that insurers needed a 120-day lead time. I know we told them, and I'm 
sure the other trades did as well, both publicly and privately. The fact that 
the emergency regulations were issued by the beginning of September or so, I 
think really didn't help us much because we have to design our systems, computer 
systems, in a very specific way to capture the specific information required. 
The regulations did not address that, they were, in effect, efforts to clarify 
some aspects of the statute, but not to specifically deal with data elements, 
which is what you get down to when you start talking about transferring 
information via various media. 
I think that, unfortunately, our experience with the Department has been 
plagued with a failure to communicate problems. 
I don't recall that any of the AI companies were contacted in advance of the 
issuing the protocols and procedures that the Fund published in October. In 
fact it wasn't finalized until the end of October, I might add. The advisory 
committee, as I understand it, was not consulted about the specific data 
elements which I think would have helped grease the skids a little bit to make 
things move more smoothly. Trade associations, at least my trade association, I 
don't recall being consulted until after the initial draft of the protocols and 
procedures were published, which I don't believe was until October. 
But, that aside, I think the biggest problem is that, as people pointed out 
before, you're talking about a program with 6.3 million policy holders. While 
insurers have very sophisticated systems, computer systems, to handle their own 
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policy holders, you're talking about in some instances melding four or five 
different separate computer systems within each company. There's a billing 
system, there's a claims system, there's an underwriting system, and this 
program requires you to pull elements from all aspects of those systems. 
And I think the basic message, you know, I'd like to convey here and I don't 
want to, unless you ask me to, go through chapter and verse on all the 
programming problems. I think that Mr. Holden is familiar with that and I do 
commend them for making a number of substantial changes in their protocols and 
procedures that I think alleviated many of the early problems we had when they 
were first published. But I think our companies are prepared to try and give 
the Fund the basic reports as soon as possible. I think it's inevitable that 
there will be delays of getting this running for at least the first three 
months, if not up to six months. our companies are scrambling to do what they 
can to get the systems on line, to begin the reporting process and the billing 
process. Renewals, by law, have to go out at least 45 days in advance and we've 
already passed that timing because many companies send their renewals out 60 to 
90 days in advance. So, as a result, we got caught in the switches here where 
we have to bill our policy holders so that they know what they have to pay for 
the next year. And also trying to meet the funds requirements of publishing the 
surcharge billing figures so that that can be paid. 
There were some other important components of this program that really 
weren't ready, again, until the end of October. We're required to include a 
notice that the Commissioner was to develop that was not ready until 
October 30th. And the matrix Mr. Holden referred to; well, it was given to us 
without numbers on October 4th. It wasn't really finalized - I guess it was 
published with numbers on, I think, October 16th, but some of those were in 
error, and then republished, I think, around October 24th or so. So, again, 
we've only had literally two or three weeks to get systems on line to meet the 
Fund's requirements. 
And I think the biggest problem that needs to be addressed from our point of 
view is: Will the Fund create some mechanism for insurers to capture those 
persons whose renewals have already gone out and haven't been billed because of 
these delays so that everyone can be on board. I think they've taken the 
position that if you haven't paid the surcharge - let's say you're a January 
renewal and the surcharge has not been paid for whatever reason because we 
haven't had time to get our systems on line and that person doesn't somehow get 
their surcharge money to the Fund, they're not going to be covered. And I think 
you're going to have a lot of mad constituents out there who didn't have an 
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opportunity to pay even though they might have wanted to because of the time 
delays. And I think that is probably a procedural problem that can be easily 
ironed out if the Department would perhaps cut everybody some slack and start 
talking about how we can get these people into the system because of the delays. 
There are some other aspects that I'd be happy to talk about or answer 
questions, but I'll defer to my colleagues here so they can get their word in. 
Thank you. 
MR. TIM HART: Mr. Chairman and Members. Tim Hart representing the 
association of California Insurance Companies. I have with me today John 
Drennan who is a Vice President and Actuary for Allstate Insurance Company. And 
John is here wearing at least three hats. Most of you know John as a source of 
information and data during the course of the debate, legislative debate, on the 
establishment of the Career Fund program. John also is active with the Federal 
Earthquake Project in providing data assistance to them on follow-up modeling 
and losses. And finally, John is the vice chairman of the advisory committee 
selected by Commissioner Garamendi and so he has been active in that process as 
well. 
Before I turn in over to John I'd like to make a couple of observations 
about testimony that's been made this morning. First of all on the mandatory 
issue, it is entirely true that insurers have opposed canceling or nonrenewing 
policies. This is part of the legislative debate on the creation of the Career 
Fund. Our industry and our members essentially agreed to be conduits for a 
State program. But I wanted to make it clear that the position we have does not 
extend to remedies exercised by the State on its own behalf. We're kind of 
surprised that there hasn't been discussion about perhaps the Commissioner 
taking action either directly or through the Attorney General against people who 
do not pay. As far as insurers are concerned, this is with all due respect to 
the Commissioner's position, we don't feel this is an insurance product and it's 
not directly tied to the insurance market except in the sense that the purchase 
of insurance is a threshold qualification for benefits and insurers have agreed 
to function as a conduit. 
One other minor technical point. I was noticing in the Jardin perspectus 
this morning that there was a statement attributed to the Association of 
California Insurance Companies about this proposal being innovating and 
exciting. And I just wanted to clarify that that was a February, 1990, response 
by the Association to the Governor's proposal as outlined in his State of the 
State Address and it should not be either interpreted literally or implicitly as 
an endorsement of the program, because we have not taken that policy position. 
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One final remark with respect to the chronology of acquaintance with an 
adoption of regulations. Two other significant events I'd like to point out. 
Our trade association and members became first aware of the content of the 
regulations in a document dated August 20th, which we received on the 22nd, 
which was captioned as an outline of the regulations. It was 17 pages. We had 
a meeting with the Department with eight days turn around and provided some 
comment on that. I'd simply wanted to point out that the final regulations as 
proposed aren't very much significantly longer than that, and we're a little 
distressed on our members' behalf that they don't answer some of the fundamental 
questions that we believe need to be answered before the program can be 
implemented responsibly. 
The one other thing I wanted to mention is that the trades and several 
insurance technical representatives met with the Department and the vendor on 
September the 16th and we tried to make it clear to them at that time that if we 
were going to get billing notices in the mail to all renewals or as many 
renewals as possible, we'd have to have the rate surcharge information and the 
notification of benefits no later than September the 30th. And even then it 
would be a stretch. 
With that I'd like to recognize John and ask- he has a few comments, I 
think, on Allstate's compliance experience to date. 
MR. JOHN DRENNAN: Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I appreciate 
the chance to bring a few comments from a company perspective to this. 
My company, in particular, has been extremely aware of what earthquake means 
to the people that we sell our products to and obviously that's very much the 
citizens of this state. My responsibilities at Allstate include attention to 
how those issues are handled in Legislatures and also the programs that are put 
in place to try to deal with that. Frankly, our commitment is to our policy 
holders to make sure that we serve them with the products that we sell, but also 
with the regulations that are put in by a State Legislature. 
I've been asked to participate as a member of the advisory committee and 
have done so. And I think that's a demonstration of our desire to have a 
program that does indeed accomplish its objectives. I'm also trying to 
demonstrate the commitment that the industry has to carry out the intent of the 
Legislature. Since the day that this legislation was passed and through the 
changes that have come in further legislative meetings, we've paid attention and 
tried to anticipate in the best way we can what does it mean to us to deal with 
our customer, and how are we going to put a program in place that carries out 
the intent. The best that I can say is that a significant amount 
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(LAUGHTER.) 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: That was the workmen in the Senate Chambers, it wasn't an 
earthquake. (Laughter.) They just dropped the new camera they're installing in 
there. Go ahead. 
MR. DRENNAN: As people say, "I knew that." (Laughter.) I wish I could say 
that I knew that in my dealings with earthquake, one of the things that I've 
never experienced is an actual event, so ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Oh, really? 
MR. DRENNAN: I'm not sure whether that's good fortune ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Let me tell you, I've been here in California since, well I 
was born here, but I've experienced every earthquake from 1932 till now. 
MR. DRENNAN: Well, I don't plan to stay here indefinitely, but (Laughter.) 
if that is the cost of avoiding an earthquake in the State of California of any 
significance, and I am willing to participate in that way. 
Our company is wrestling with this by putting together various groups, 
various task forces, in our organizations to implement this legislation. we 
have task force that are dealing with the compliance issue. We are concerned 
mostly about the dealings with our customers who, for whatever reason, decide 
that they do not want to participate in this program. With the lack of what 
appear to be effective implementation of the program, we are anticipating that 
some of our customers are going to opt out. And thus, we are planning to 
continue our relationship with them as insurers without jeopardizing that 
relationship by virtue of this program. Now, I think that what we are looking 
for is removal of the uncertainty as to how to deal with the customer. That is 
exactly what we're asking that the Insurance Department, through regulation, and 
if that is not possible, that the Legislature through revised legislation, 
remove from the dealings with our customers. But, being committed to that, we 
have been and are moving towards introducing to our customers the necessary 
billings and establishing the accounting procedures to transmit the funds to the 
program. 
We feel that the issues have been reduced as we have proceeded over the last 
several months, but the real critical ones that we have talked about today 
remain. And to the extent that they can in fact be addressed and removed, then 
I think you will see that the insurance industry will be able to do the job that 
the Legislature presented to them. Whether we will have everything working on 
January 1st as we would like it to have been, as we might have been able to do 
it with sufficient advance warning, is really immaterial. The things that must 
be done, I think, are in fact going to be done and that is conveying to the 
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customers the evidence that this program is in place, the cost to them and to 
transmit the funds into the California Earthquake Fund. 
The details of reporting the information to make sure that this works 
correctly are being worked out and will be worked out. We ask that the 
Department be aware that only what is essential need be reported because by 
adding the reporting requirements to the industry, we are adding additional 
costs to our delivering our product to our customers and that is of very much 
concern. 
So I think that - I just would like to reaffirm that the industry, and 
especially my company, is committed to do the intent of the legislation, and we 
will participate in any way possible to try to resolve any of the problems. We 
ask the Department to listen to us because I think we have experience in 
collecting large amounts of money and responding to needs of policy holders when 
they arise, so we're asking for cooperation in that respect, too. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I bounced around in my head, should I ask this question or 
shouldn't I, and I'm going to. You're a member of the commission, it's a very 
key element and part of what I felt the intent of the legislation was was the 
advisory committee. Have you been used properly? 
MR. DRENNAN: In my opinion, we have not been used in the spirit that I 
thought the advisory committee was created, and that was to truly be a source of 
not only input, but also discussion on those matters that were necessary to 
implement the program. I do think that the advisory committee has had the 
benefit of many of the decisions that the Department has had to make by 
themselves, but generally it has been basically to review them and to comment 
after the fact as to help - rather than to help shape some of the decisions. 
And particularly in the selection of the vendors. It's my belief that the 
advisory committee was simply alerted as to who was being contacted and 
ultimately who was decided, but the advisory committee was not asked to put it's 
opinion forward in any great detail as to what was required. I don't know 
whether that's the result of the extremely constricted time frames that the 
Department had to operate under or whether it was their opinions as to what 
their authority were. But as far as the committee goes, I feel that we have 
basically been reviewing and giving agreement to decisions that have been made 
by the Department as opposed to actually putting input to many of those 
decisions. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you. That's kind of my opinion. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Senator Green? I have a follow up question. Question 
for the witness. In your opinion, can a workable program be put in place? 
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MR. DRENNAN: In my opinion, it can. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: It can't. 
MR. DRENNAN: It can. Yes, it can. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: It can. OK. From your experience as a member of the 
commission, why aren't we further along on this? I mean, I've heard and read 
all the reports and all the excuses and all the horribles conjured up and 
paraded out in terms of what's going to happen or what isn't going to happen. 
But in your studied opinion and from your experiences, why isn't it happening? 
MR. DRENNAN: I think very many of the delays are because of the uncertainty 
of what the authority of the Department is via regulation and the conflict with 
the legislation which basically tells us that we cannot impose penalties on 
insureds for failure to pay the surcharge. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Do you think the will exists within the Department to 
establish this program? 
MR. DRENNAN: I think that the Department has acted to try to implement the 
program, but I guess my feeling is that they have not used the advisory 
committee whenever questions of - or barriers in the existing program are 
identified. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Give us some examples of how the advisory committee 
could have been used more effectively to help remedy this impasse. 
MR. DRENNAN: Well with the question as to the emergency regulations and how 
they would enforce compliance, the advisory committee was not asked how would we 
get around that barrier. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: How would you have done it? What advice would you have 
given to the Department had you been asked? 
MR. DRENNAN: I think I would have recommended that the Department of 
Insurance put a somewhat lengthy list of ways to comply with the mandation 
together. One of the ways would obviously have included the possibility of 
cancellation of the insurance policy, but that interpretation by counsel 
appeared to be taken away. And I know we've had comments today about whether or 
not that was the proper interpretation, but nevertheless, that was the one. But 
many other ways to allow the revenues to be collected including using something 
other than the insurance mechanism should have been listed that would, if 
followed, have assured the revenue stream. My feeling would be if in any way 
the revenue stream for this program had been assured, then the questions with 
respect to identifying available reinsurance and the issuing of revenue bonds 
would've been able to be dealt with much more specifically, but since the 
revenue stream was not protected, then I think those entities have every reason 
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to suggest - I can only go so far, but I can't give you firm recommendations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: I guess what frustrates me and the others, at least 
those of us that were involved in promoting and sponsoring this program and the 
legislation that created it, is that - and I carried Senator Hill and Senator 
Green's bill on the Floor when it went off the Assembly - and there's no doubt 
in my mind that every Member that voted for or against that measure recognized 
that this was a mandatory program. That was the legislative intent. Now, if 
afterwards interpretations determine that there was some technical glitch in the 
legislation that allowed somebody to get out of it or challenge it, then fine. 
We face those dilemmas in this Legislature all the time, and we go back with 
corrective or technical legislation, you bring everybody together. But to use 
that to stalemate and stymie this program and frankly put the whole thing in 
jeopardy, to me is inexcusable. If the will is there to get it established, or 
had been there, it would be established and it would be on time. 
MR. DRENNAN: The uncertainty that insurers are facing right now really is 
not whether there's going to be mass defection. We do not expect that. We 
expect that the majority of our customers are going to receive the bill and they 
in fact are going to comply with the wishes of the Legislature. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: What percentage? When you say the majority, what 
percentage of compliance would you anticipate, even under the current 
environment? 
MR. DRENNAN: I, personally, would be very surprised if more than 10 percent 
of our policy holders do not comply with the billing requirement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: So it doesn't put the revenue stream in serious 
jeopardy, while we're straightening out these glitches? 
MR. DRENNAN: It, frankly, doesn't put the revenue stream in serious 
jeopardy not only because of the relatively small percentage that won't comply, 
but secondly, those that don't comply in putting money into the system also do 
not take money out of the system. So the testimony that we heard early today 
about the average cost per participant really is not going to change 
significantly by those who opt not to be in the system. There could be some 
adverse selection because the people who opt out of the system may do that 
because they feel they don't need the program. But I don't think, personally, 
that the adverse selection issue is a serious one, in the pricing matter. But 
it is a serious one when you ask the reinsurers community to try to place 
coverage and you frankly do not know where your retention is truly going to end 
up, nor do you know what the true excess amount of coverage you're actually 
seeking. Those are questions that are going to be defined by the number of 
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participants in the program. And while I can say that I would be surprised, 
it's entirely possible that I could be surprised, that there could be 
significantly larger numbers. But our experience would say that the vast 
majority of the policy holders will pay and especially they will pay when they 
are informed that it's the law of the State. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Well, the more that issue is used to put the death nell 
or nail in the coffin of this program, the more defections you're going to get. 
If we would use that collective energy to go in and fix any technical flaws in 
the Program with follow-up legislation, whatever it requires, I think it would 
be used much more effectively. But, in order for this program, Senator Green, 
in order for this program to be effective and to reduce the number of 
misunderstandings that, and expectations that may not be met in terms of the 
general public that would be covered by this program, we need the cooperation, 
the full cooperation, of the insurance industry and their agents. And the only 
way that can happen is if they know what to do and what the program is. And 
until now and remaining, they don't, they don't know what it is and there's a 
great deal of uncertainty. 
MR. DRENNAN: One more point I would like to make, and frankly it's one that 
hasn't been brought out very well in any discussion up to now, and that is, who 
are going to be the spokespersons for the program. In general, the legislation 
says that insurers will surcharge and will collect revenues, but by having that 
duty then insurers are probably going to have to become the spokespersons for 
the program. The agents of our company are the people who talk with our 
customers and our customers trust the agents to tell them why they have to do 
some things. We are, we are having serious problems in meeting the 
implementation program because of how to educate our agents to deal with our 
customers. Now I say problems, and they are not insurmountable, and we do 
expect to be ready on January 1st to do the tasks that we have, but we really 
want our agents to be speaking as ambassadors for our company and doing the 
intent of the Legislature. And we will caution them and we will educate them to 
do just that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you. Go ahead. 
MS. DOLAN: I just wanted to convey to the Commissioner the discussion over 
mandatory and I thought it might be useful if the insurers would comment on the 
Legislative Counsel's Opinion that the Department has the authority to require 
them to collect the surcharges. 
MR. TIM HART: Mr. Chairman, just on behalf of our members, we're familiar 
with Legislative Counsel's Opinion. I think the problem we have in responding 
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to the Commissioner's question is what is meant by collection proceedings 
instituted by insurers. Now if by that the Department is talking about getting 
insurers more involved in rebilling people who either refuse to pay or are not 
paid in that process, that's one thing. But if they're talking about using 
insurers or requiring insurers to enforce the law of the State by prejudicing 
independent contractual relationships with their own customers, I think that's a 
different story entirely. There is a provision in - there was a provision in 
SB 2902 which specifically provided that the fund law was not to be construed to 
impair or interfere with independent contractual relations between an insurer 
and an insured. I'd simply renew our point. With all due respect to the 
Commissioner's point of view, we view this as a benefit program and not an 
insurance policy. And the position that we took when this Fund was created is 
that we would carry the State's water, but not drown our own customers. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. Finished? 
MR. HART: Sure. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I think probably the biggest thing I heard right here right 
now is that there is a wealth of information and knowledge on a committee that's 
not being used. And I would certainly like a very pointed answer as to why. 
The intent of this legislation when it was proposed was that these regulations, 
the financing, all of the problems that we're talking about and have been 
talking about was the responsibility of a commission. Yes, the Commissioner is 
the final decision maker, but this commission can give you an awful lot of help 
and you're losing a resource by not using it. 
MR. HOLDEN: I agree with you. The committee is a very valuable resource 
and it has been our impression that we have in fact used them extensively and 
gotten tremendous feedback from them. I believe the chairman from the advisory 
committee is here and another member of the advisory committee is here. We 
have, to the greatest extent possible, welcomed their input on any matter 
related to the program. We have provided to them issues that we think need to 
be discussed for us to move forward for the program. To that extent, and we 
provided a recommended agenda for them to use in their meetings and have had 
discussions with the chairman before we set that agenda. In addition, during 
the advisory committee meetings, we ask if there are other things that need to 
be discussed. We have tried to use that advisory committee as much as possible 
and it's really a sterling committee and they've provided us excellent advice on 
a number of issues, and some of that advice the Commissioner has adopted 
directly, such as on the rates and on a couple of different occasions and 
they've been, I think, a terrific sounding board. I'm disappointed that John 
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hasn't brought up some of these issues in the committee. I think if there are 
additional things to be discussed, we are open to them. We had planned on using 
that committee in that process and once again, it's really ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: It depends on how you use a committee, before the fact or 
after the fact. And it is my interpretation is that you're using them after the 
fact. We'll get off of that subject. Next. 
MS. MARIALEE NEIGHBORS: Yes. Marialee Neighbors for the Alliance of 
American Insurers. I share the concerns that have been raised by the other 
trade associations and John for Allstate. The greatest problem for us has been 
that the information that we needed from the Department in order for companies 
to move forward and implement the program had arrived and were received by 
companies at a time that was really very late in the process. Our final 
protocol and procedure guidelines weren't received until the end of October. We 
know the Department has worked hard to implement the program. We've tried to 
cooperate, but this has been a really insurmountable problem particular for our 
smaller, our medium sized companies. And we had written the Department. We've 
asked our companies to share their concerns with the Department regarding the 
actual implementation issues and they have also sent letters to you indicating 
some of those technical problems. Our companies have wanted to cooperate, but 
you can realize that particularly for a small company that doesn't have 40 or 50 
persons to take off other projects and devote solely to this project that when 
they don't have all the information available and they have to process something 
in a very, very short period of time, it does become a great problem. 
Nevertheless, we want to continue to work with the Department and you in terms 
of implementing this program, we'll do the best we can. The problem of not 
having adequate time to go through the computer changes and reprogramming and 
programs is quite a problem for the companies. 
MS. DIANE COBALT (??): Diane Cobalt for State Farm Insurance Companies. We 
also agree with a number of the points that were made by the previous insurer 
speakers. We are in the process of having to go through and reprogram our 
massive computer systems which are centralized in Illinois. And while there's 
certain problems that are faced by smaller companies that Marialee pointed to, 
even the larger companies like State Farm, this is not something that can be 
done over night. And there's time that we need to go through test runs of the 
system once we get all of the data inputted to make sure that we're not creating 
other problems. And we, early in the Fall, began the process of informing our 
policy holders, we sent out an earlier notice to them that this program was 
going to be coming on line, that we did not have the surcharge data yet, that 
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when we did get that there would be - you know, that this would be coming on 
board, but we just - as I think someone else mentioned, the law requires that 
the renewal notices go out so many days before they're due and so the notices 
for the January renewals had to go out already, and we just didn't have the data 
in tLme to do that. But we are doing the best we can to comply with it as soon 
as possible. Meeting the January deadline is going to be difficult. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Push the button, if you would. 
MR. LONNIE ATKISSON: ••• inaudible ••• and I thought maybe I would move 
forward just a spot on the agenda. 
We have had a total of five meetings now and yes when we first formed there 
were bids already out for the administrator of the program. Since that time we 
have participated in all of the activities that the Department of Insurance has 
brought forward. 
And if I may, I'd like to share for a moment what my feelings were as the 
chairman. And I received a letter from the Commissioner that said the committee 
was formed to help evaluate and select earthquake loss estimators for the 
purpose of establishing a financial structure that is actuarially sound, as well 
as to sort out the options for modifying surcharges, deductibles, and coverage 
in a way that insures solvency of the CRER Fund. And that is exactly what we 
have attempted to do over the last five meetings, taking into effect first of 
all that there was not a mandatory program. The mandatory program is not there 
because of either the Legislature or the Department. The participation level, I 
think, is unknown. The private market right now is about 25 percent of the 
private market people actually purchase earthquake coverage. Maybe because it's 
too high, but that is the limit, basically, where they are. And I don't know 
that we can predict how many people will in fact come on board should the 
program not be mandatory, just as we cannot predict exactly what kind of an 
earthquake we're going to have next. I think as a committee we've tried to work 
with an awful lot of unknowns and uncertainties as to exactly how many people 
will be insured, exactly what the losses might be. 
We have changed programs. For example, when the program first went out for 
loss estimation, it included cosmetic damage which changed drastically the 
amount of money that might be involved for a total loss. It was later changed 
to include structural damage only, and I'm sure that this may release or reduce 
the loss estimation as far as the total dollars as a result of an earthquake. 
It has been difficult to try and create, if you will, an insurance company 
of 6.3 million. And that may be another assumption that keeps coming up, as to 
whether or not we're talking about creating an insurance company or if we are 
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talking about creating a fund or a pool. It seems as though as we talk about 
items that are in the bill, such as reinsurance and bonds, we seem to be 
depleting the funds available to almost 50 percent or at least 40 percent almost 
immediately. And that is reinsurance at maybe $40 million, bonds indebtedness 
at maybe as much s $100 million a year. And I think that there has to possibly 
be a decision as to whether or not we wish to be able to pay everyone in the 
first year or whether or not we wish the Fund to accumulate as fast as possible 
with no other drains in the way of reinsurance and bonds ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: You can't guarantee there won't be a drain the first year 
because you can't guarantee there won't be an earthquake. 
MR. ATKISSON: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So you have to cover it for a long period of time. Here's 
one person that's had the experience you're talking about and what we're trying 
to do. We build a joint powers insurance authority with no money for 30 cities 
and it was started with a fund. We got coinsurance at a cost. We got through 
for a number of years and a few years ago that went to self insurance and away 
from the umbrella policy, but it was a planned structure and it was something 
this plan can do and should do. It's possible, if it's planned properly. And 
if the people that are in it to plan it want it to succeed, it will succeed. 
But what I hear from you is kind of what I'm hearing from staff. 
MR. ATKISSON: OK. Well, I think it's a situation that we don't know 
exactly what ballpark we're playing on because we don't know exactly how many 
participants there will be. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I've gone through this and in 1978 I put together an 
insurance risk pool for 30 cities that now have 65 cities in it. They have went 
together when in 1978 dollars and charge an 80 percent deposit every year of 
that dollar and until I came to this Legislature that pool had given back to 
those cities 50 percent of the 80 percent on $78. It has now built up an amass 
over $65 million in an excess pool to pay off the insurance. Now why can't we 
do that on a the state level when we can do it on local government level. And 
it's totally self insured. That's what I envisioned when we wrote this 
legislation. And as all I hear from everyone is we can't do something. 
MR. ATKISSON: I think there's a lot of things we can do, there's just some 
things that we don't know. And the things that we don't know 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, we don't know because we don't take the chance and we 
don't put it in front of the committee. And if the committee won't look at it 
and say let's work it out, then what can we expect? 
I'm sorry, that's an outburst I don't normally give, but I find this whole 
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issue one of - I've sat there for hour after hour after hour of this testimony 
from everyone, and that homeowner out there is hurting. We must help that 
homeowner! And we have to find a way to do it. 
Anything from anyone else now? Thank you. 
This next issue we'll go into and it should have a lot of discussion, but I 
would ask that we not give it over 20 minutes and we'll have to continue it to 
our next meeting on December 4th, because this is something that has surfaced 
and it's clarification on participation of mobile homes, condominiums and other 
multiple family dwellings. This is - so anyone on that part of the issue, if 
you would come forward please. 
MR. MAURICE PRIEST: Mr. Chairman and Members, Maurice Priest representing 
Golden State Mobilehome owners League. We had asked to make a comment on the 
Earthquake Recovery Fund. 
There are approximately a million people in California who live in mobile 
homes and we had several discussions with Senator Hill's office last year with 
regard to his measure, and believe that mobilehome owners in California could 
also benefit from the Earthquake Recovery Fund. And we looked at some of the 
aspects of deductible& and how it might help address their problems if they 
suffered damage from an earthquake. And we're very concerned about the 
application of the Earthquake Fund to those homeowners in California. I know 
that the mandatory provisions of the Fund were not only to make it economically 
viable, but also based on the assumption that the homeowners who pay that 
surcharge are also going to have a chance to equally benefit or participate in 
the fund. And we're finding out upon closer examination that mobilehome owners 
in California will not be benefiting equally at all from the fund. 
And let me give you an illustration. For the last 25 years, GSMOL has 
worked closely with insurance carriers in California and in some cases we have 
endorsed and recommended to our statewide membership certain carriers who 
develop policies that we consider to be very, very beneficial to our members. 
And the homeowners insurance policies that we have recommended for a number of 
years also include earthquake coverage. Since the passage of this measure we've 
had a chance to go back to those insurance carriers and the agents to work 
through a scenario, what if this happens? And we've also had the benefit of 
examining the Insurance Commissioner's map imposing the three zones where 
mobilehomes, also within those three zones, would be paying the maximum $60 
surcharge. our insurance carriers have been able to advise us that the average 
mobilehome owner in California is insured for $50,000 or less. That means that 
on those plans, which also include earthquake coverage, their deductible is 
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going to be $1,000. Because the deductible under the Earthquake Recovery Fund 
is also $1,000, they would be collecting -0- from the Fund. Now, someone who 
may be two or three blocks away living in a conventional home paying the $60 
surcharge could collect up to the maximum of $15,000 from the Earthquake 
Recovery Fund. That's- when the- as one of the gentlemen on the commission 
stated just a few moments ago, when the billings go out and the questions come 
from our members, from our insureds, and they contact their agents and the 
carriers who are very cooperative and very helpful and very professional and 
they're reassured by their own agents that yes they do have to pay the $60 
surcharge if they're in those three zones, and yes they will not be able to 
present any type of claim. There's not going to be very many happy mobilehome 
owners within those districts. 
And I would remind the committee, as you know - as you already know that 
most of the mobilehome owners in California are senior citizens. A survey done 
by Foremost Insurance several years ago indicated that the average of our own 
members was 69 years plus. Most of them are on fixed incomes. Many of them 
totally dependent upon Social Security. 
Our comments at this time, we're very motivated to work with the Legislature 
and with the Department of Insurance to make an appropriate adjustment. And I'm 
not suggesting to you now what that should be, but we've all assumed that the 
people who contribute would somehow be able to benefit from the Fund. And 
through information we've recently been able to get from our carriers and 
agents, the mobilehome owners are really going to come out at the short end. 
And it appears that they're going to contributing and subsidizing a fund that 
they're not going to be collect from, and we think that inequity should be 
addressed. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you. I think the Department ought to respond on this 
one because I know of no policy that has that small of a deductible. 
MR. HOLDEN: We had heard last year when there were hearings on the 
legislation, clean-up legislation, that in fact that mobilehome owners did have 
very low deductible policies. And I attempted a couple of times to contact Mr. 
Priest to find out - to get resolution on that early on. Mr. Priest, I 
understand, contacted Senator Hill's office and expressed concerns about 
mobilehome owners being included in the program, that there would be some 
coverage overlap, which is consistent with what we had heard. They were asked 
to provide additional information, correct me if I'm wrong Shannon - provide 
additional information, and they wrote a subsequent letter saying that they did 
want to be included in the program. Our information has to be based on what the 
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mobilehome owners have told us and they did not request an exemption at the end. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yeah, I think this issue, then, is one that has to be 
addressed legislatively, because currently you are in the legislation. Whether 
you got there voluntarily or - that has nothing to do with the fix later on, 
because there's going to be a continuum of fixes on this legislation. So, it's 
good that you come forth and let us know that there is a problem with the 
mobilehome. 
OK. Thank you. 
Sal, do you have a question? 
MR. BIANCO: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to suggest that the 
Subcommittee request the Department of Insurance at the next hearing to just 
provide in summary writing, verbally or whatever, what the status is in terms of 
coverage for mobilehomes relating to deductible. The mobilehome association is 
attempting to tell this committee that mobilehome coverages have only a two 
percent deductible. That's what you're telling us, and I think it's really 
important that we know what policies are out there, if in fact they're all two 
percent policies. If they are, then the $1,000 is absolutely correct. If 
they're not, then there's a totally different view on this issue. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yeah, and then you got several issues because the issue is: 
does everyone have the policy? Because I sat in hearings with mobilehome owners 
that had their mobilehome shook off the wheels and they were in big hurt because 
they were seniors and couldn't put it back together because they didn't have the 
money. 
MR. MARK RAKICH: Mark Rakich with the Department. I just wanted to comment 
on Sal's request. 
As I guess some Members of the committee and staff know, we don't have 
policy approval in filing requirements in property casualty. We're certainly 
more than happy to try to dig that out. I suspect that we don't have that data 
on anything better than an anecdotal basis based on complaints and things like 
that coming in. We did look at this question of whether mobile homes are in -
should be in or out based on whether there would be any viable economic benefit. 
And we heard, anecdotally only, very mixed signals. Some saying there was, you 
know, standard homeowners type deductible&, and others saying that it was the 
same as the traditional residential earthquake policy. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: But they're not the same, they don't have fireplaces. They 
don't have a lot of those things that are damaged by earthquake damage. 
MR. RAKICH: With respect to this question, we had received mixed signals 
both in the course of the 1991 legislative year as well as in the 1990 
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legislative year when this came up. I don't have the committee reports with me 
here, but I suspect Sal could confirm that we didn't hear about the mobilehome 
problem very early and with any degree of definiteness as to what the situation 
is. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well I think that we should have some formal report of what 
you do have coming back and this is an issue we can't fix today, because it's 
going to take legislation in the future. 
MR. HOLDEN: We'll try to secure more information on that. 
MR. PRIEST: And Mr. Chairman, I was here during the testimony today when 
there was some discussion as to whether the Department of Insurance has the 
regulatory authority to address certain concerns. And if this happens to be an 
area where they have such regulatory authority, we'd be happy to cooperate with 
them and to suggest that they might exercise that with regard to the mobilehome 
issue until we can do something legislatively. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: And it's a possibility because mobile homes are treated 
differently than property taxes. I don't know, they'll look at it. 
Thank you. 
MS. ROBYN STEWART: Senator Green? 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes. 
MS. STEWART: Could I also request that in your report back on this issue, 
you give some attention to utilizing that maximum surcharge amount of $60 in 
three of the zones for this type of structure. 
MR. HOLDEN: I can respond to you right now on that. The rates that were 
set for mobilehomes - we didn't pick the highest number. These are actual 
numbers that were based on the actual risk in those zones, and that's why it 
turned out to be $60. If private insurers are selling it for less, they're 
getting a deal. 
MR. BIANCO: Mr. Chairman. I think the other thing you may want the 
Department to also think about is the extent to which if it were a true $1,000 
deductible on mobilehome policies. And I think there has to be a distinction 
made clearly between coverage for mobilehomes and the use of an affiliate 
insurer for purposes of meeting current laws' requirements on the mandate to 
offer earthquake coverage. There is a difference. OK? In other words, the 
statute has provided ever since 1985 that for purposes of meeting the mandate to 
offer earthquake coverage that an affiliate insurer may be utilized to do that; 
i.e., the carrier that's providing the mobilehome coverage does not necessarily 
have to be the same entity providing the earthquake coverage. And that's an 
important distinction that needs to be made when you're looking at the extent to 
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which there are policies out there. You may also want to look at, for purposes 
of this, whether or not you might want to sell first dollar coverage for that 
deductible on - and look at it from an actuarial basis for the $1,000, if that's 
truly the number. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you. OK, anything else? Then thank you for coming. 
Do we have anyone here from condominiums? You're a condominium. 
MS. STEWART: Not really, I'm a person. (Laughter.) 
My name is Robyn Boyer Stewart and I'm here representing the executive 
council of homeowners. We are an association that represents condominiums as 
well as planned developments. In California there are about three million 
homeowners who live in this form of housing. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: And it's growing. 
MS. STEWART: And it's growing. It's the fastest growing form of housing in 
California today. 
We're here to refer primarily to the letter that we provided the Committee 
in November which outlines two of our concerns. With respect to your question 
on the agenda: Does this need some clarification? We have to answer: Yes, we 
do. Our particular concern is that as we understand the regulations and as we 
understand SB 2902 as it would be implemented, it would currently put our 
members essentially in between a rock and hard place, and let me explain. Right 
now California Civil Code Section 1366, which is referred to as the 
Davis/Stirling Act which is the governing law for condominium and planned 
development associations, requires of its members that they provide, for 
instance 60 days before the end of their fiscal year, a proforma budget. And in 
that budget they have to anticipate what the costs are going to be for the year. 
And if there is a need for an increase in the assessment, then it has to be 
dealt with at that time. Davis/Stirling has a ceiling on it which does not 
allow a board to raise the dues in excess of 20 percent in any given year 
without a vote of the membership. We're concerned that given the uncertainty of 
what the cost of the premium would be, and we've heard figures ranging from $12 
to $60 or $25 to $75, that this will create tremendous problems for us for the 
number of reasons. One of which is many, many of our associations are operating 
very close to a margin as it is, and when you levy an assessment of $60, for 
instance, per unit, for many, many associations that could constitute a number 
in excess of 20 percent of the budget. Ordinarily to amend the CC&Rs or to take 
an issue to the vote of the membership requires anywhere from $3,000 to $5,000 
to retain an attorney, to issue the votes, and it's a huge problem. 
There is also a requirement in some CC&Rs that they have to notify the 
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lenders when there is this kind of an increase. And in that case that's often 
impossible because many people don't know who has the paper on their loans. So 
these are issues which our association is continuing to deal with primarily in 
the housing committees and as this form of housing sort of comes to maturity, 
they've only been around 15 - 20 years, more of this will emerge and will 
become clearer. 
Our responsibility to you and to the Department is to sort of educate you as 
to what these particular concerns are. 
Specifically, we would ask that there be some sort of legislation next year, 
some emergency legislation, which would for instance allow a board to increase 
the dues as necessary, in this case because of a State mandated program. That 
would essentially take care of that. 
So, there are though problems with the business of rescinding budgets that 
have already been sent out. Having to reconfigure them or redefine them, and 
then to mail them all out. And as this gentleman earlier recognized, most of 
the people living in mobilehomes are seniors. A good number of people living in 
condominiums are seniors as well, living on fixed incomes, and they in fact - an 
increase of this kind represents a huge hit on them. So we ask you to be aware 
of that. 
The other concern that we have has to do with the fact that the law and then 
the subsequent implementing regulations make a distinction that doesn't really 
exist. That is, in trying to, - and I appreciate why this was done - in trying 
to distinguish between owner-occupied units and tenant-occupied units, although 
well intended I'm sure, it's impossible to do that. The state law and the 
governing documents of condominiums do not allow them to make that distinction. 
The only recognized legal entity in a condominium association are the unit 
owners. There are several problems that arise; again, it is very difficult to 
know who is renting and who is owning. Not all associations have that 
information. There's been suggestions that the insurers would know that, but I 
submit that that's not always true because who they deal with are the 
association boards, not with unit owners. So we would ask that that be 
clarified in the law as well as in the implementing regulations. The problem is 
that when a claim - it's our understanding that as these assessments or this 
surcharge is made, assuming all these other problems were dealt with, as this 
assessment would be made based on owner occupancy. Then assuming there is an 
earthquake and then there is a claim made, it's the structure that is, in fact, 
insured. Then you're going to have some discrepancy in terms of whether or not 
it was owner occupied. Then when claims are made, who gets paid? We posed this 
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question to the Department and were told that who would be paid would be the 
association. So that essentially you're giving the responsibility to distribute 
the claim money to owners or - it would have to go to the owners because they're 
the only legal entity that they can recognize, to a lay volunteer board. And I 
can assure you this would give rise to tremendous litigation. 
Unfortunately, many condominium associations are known as litigation 
factories, given the problems that go on in them with enforcement of the CC&Rs 
and all of that, they're very quick to go to court because there aren't a lot of 
alternative ways. I submit to you that the way this is currently set up it 
would be not only a burden, but it would be a real challenge to these boards to 
try to be responsible for that. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Let me break in here. In the legislation, doesn't it 
address regulations for condominiums? 
MR. HOLDEN: Yes, it does. It specifies that condominiums are covered under 
the program, individually-owned condominiums. And then later on it provides one 
exclusion for rental properties and that is to single-family dwellings. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, but these regulations are set up ••• 
MS. STEWART: So you can't do that ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait minute, pardon me. 
The Insurance Commissioner has the authority and is mandated to make 
regulations for condominiums. What you're talking about is not a change of law, 
but a change of - this is something that should go in front of the committee and 
in front of the Commissioner as far as the regulations affecting the 
condominiums. 
MS. STEWART: Well, we're more than happy to work with whomever is the 
responsible entity to change that because as I say ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Am I right in this? 
MS. STEWART: ••• you cannot make that distinction. 
MR. HOLDEN: You are correct, but I think what Ms. Boyer-Stewart is saying 
is is that there is the problem with Davis/Stirling on the budget end. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, that's a minor thing. She's talking about a whole 
bunch of other issues. These issues set down by regulations. I can, yes, the 
Stirling thing is legislative, but the overall package of what she's talking 
about is squarely in the Commissioner's lap. 
MS. STEWART: Well, it was my understanding that it was - in 412 where it 
named owner-occupancy, it made that distinction. Is that correct? 
MR. HOLDEN: That's correct. It is in statute that it's owner-occupancy 
with respect to condominiums. 
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MS. STEWART: So we just need to remove that, because it's important to 
recognize that the legal entities are the associations which are governed by 
documents referred to as bylaws and CC&Rs which, by the way, vary throughout the 
state. So when you make that distinction between owner-occupancy and rental, 
you're opening up the board to incredible liability as well as ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, I want to continue this on through to our next 
meeting, December 4th, and give it some time ••• 
MS. STEWART: OK. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: because I think it's an important enough issue and I 
want to get a report from staff is who's responsibility is this, Legislative or 
is it the Commissioner? We have to come to some conclusion on that. I hear 
both things. 
MS. STEWART: OK. There was one other thing and I've talked with your staff 
about it. That is, it may be advisable to request a Legislative Counsel Opinion 
with respect to this problem that a board may not raise their dues in excess of 
20 percent should this surcharge exceed that. If they comply with the mandate, 
they're in violation of Davis/Stirling and if they do not, they're in violation 
of the mandate. So we would like to see some clarification there. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well, on the words of the Stirling Act, the last words in 
your own sentence, it answers that, except as necessary for emergency situation. 
It's an emergency thing when the State mandates a cost to you. 
MS. STEWART: I hope so, but we would like to see that clarified. Obviously 
if there were an earthquake, then it's an emergency, but just implementing a 
program to address the possibility of an earthquake. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Well it's an emergency as far as the Fund is concerned to 
keep it in balance. Yes it is an emergency. If you didn't pay it, you would 
have an emergency. 
MS. STEWART: Well I can assure you again that there are going to be any 
number of homeowners who will sue their boards because the board construed it in 
your way when it can in fact be construed another way. And again this opens up 
tremendous exposure for our board people. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: There is no way in the World that we here in Sacramento can 
write all laws where we're not, where people are not going to sue. I wish it 
were totally possible. And if your people want to be sue happy, so be it. But 
somebody has to sit back and say this is the way it is. OK? 
MS. STEWART: Well that's what we're asking is if you would clarify this as 
the way it is, then we're really satisfied. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: You have attorneys for that and ••• 
Page 72 
MS. STEWART: And they have said that in fact they would be in violation of 
Davis/Stirling if they raise 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: I bet I can poll 20 attorneys to take the other opinion. 
(Laughter.) 
MS. STEWART: Well there you are, see. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: So you're going to be sue happy anyhow. 
MS. STEWART: No, we're (Laughter.) -we're just asking for clarification. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: All right. Thank you. 
MS. STEWART: OK? Thank you. 
MR. HOLDEN: I would just say, we had suggested that they try to obtain a 
Leg Counsel Opinion on that and that might be helpful to all of us. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: It possibly could. And Leg Counsel is real loaded as far 
as these opinions are concerned and we don't get them very rapidly, but we'll 
request one. 
Anything further to come before the hearing? 
--Inaudible--
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Yes. If you can take about ten minutes, I'm about a half 
hour late now to my appointment. 
We'll be very brief. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: OK. I'm sorry it kind of got out of hand as far as time is 
concerned, but it's a big subject. 
MR. BILL GLASCOCK: My name is Bill Glascock. I'm an independent insurance 
agent and broker in San Rafael. With me is Michael Cabbot who is the executive 
director of the Western Association of Insurance Brokers. I'm also representing 
the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California. 
For 15 years now we have been, as a trade association, enthusiastic about 
governmental help in solving this residential earthquake insurance program. 
Without going into any detail about our proposals, we have hoped that this 
program would be a good program because we, our members, have to sell this 
insurance program to our clients, consumers. We had hoped that we could, in all 
honesty, tell our clients that this is a sound program, it's a good program, you 
should pay the premium, pay the assessment. our members are having some serious 
concerns about it now given the proration possibility and, indeed, probability 
if there's a blowout in the first couple years of this program. 
We're also concerned about the fact that this is really not insurance, this 
is a disaster relief program. It bears none of the incidence of insurance, true 
insurance, and the thought that has occurred to me, sitting here this morning 
listening to these deliberations, that maybe one of the problems in this is that 
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it's tagged on to the insurance policy and we tend to think of this as being 
insurance. We keep falling back into that trap. I had hoped that the 
collection problems could be resolved thus assuring a mandatory program which is 
so necessary to the integrity of the program. We'll just have to wait and see 
how that works out. 
My clients, about 30 percent of my clients, carry earthquake insurance, the 
other 70 percent really don't care about it at any price, and I'm in the north 
bay area here in San Rafael. I'm very concerned that - Lonnie Atkisson 
testified that he wasn't sure, but he felt there might be a number of people who 
didn't pony up when asked to. I feel that there will be a significant number in 
our area of people who, given the opportunity to not pay, will not pay this 
assessment. 
I'd like to suggest, in conclusion, that a better way logically, as I see it 
and our trade association sees it, for the assessment to be made is through the 
County Assessors office where the records exist already. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: That's one of the options that the Commission should be 
looking and the Commissioner's office should be thinking about. 
MR. GLASCOCK: Thank you. Great. Because that really makes sense to us. 
And so much of this would be avoided, so much of this discussion could have been 
avoided had a simple system been designed, or hopefully can be designed. 
That's all I have, Senator. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: That's one of the options that should be really looked at 
and has been and that's been come out in front of the Committee many, many 
times. 
MR. MIKE CABBOT: I echo what Bill said. There's only one other thing I'd 
like to bring up. We represent some 13,000 independent producers in this state. 
One of the problems we see with the program is that even though this is a 
state program and the companies are going to tack it on to their policies, the 
insured's will be calling us to service the policies. They will be calling us 
to take care of their claims. They will be asking us to do a lot of work for 
them on this. We will be doing record keeping work in our own office, which we 
have to keep records for seven years. We'll be doing all of this for the grand 
sum of $1.00 which we split with the carriers. I would submit that our average 
member to put a policy in his office cost him between $25 and $30, just base 
without any profit at all. Now the members of our association are going to be 
going to a great expense and there should be some way to address this. They 
shouldn't be subsidizing the program. That's what I want to say. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Thank you very much. 
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MR. CABBOT: Thank you, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN GREEN: Anything further? Then we'll stand adjourned until 
December the 4th by which we'll then continue our hearing. 
--ooOoo--
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